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Descriptive Abstract 
ntis thesis examines MangoSUlhlI Ihlhelvi's emergence as a national leader during the 
Aparlheid era in South Africa and his subsequent decline in status thus far in lh~ COlInlr)'s 
dcmocratic context. Much of the 1iter~ture wriuenon RlIthde/i's "-sccnt to J"lI"",cr focuses on 
his eng"-gement with lhe process of ethnic mobilization and on his dispensing ofp<ltronage to 
those "ho were residing in thc homclmxl of KwJ.lulu. \\11ilsl alt~ntion is gi,~n 10 
lluthclezi's im'olycmcnt with ethnic mobili/.ation ~nd wilh palronage, the focal point of this 
sllxly is th~t ol'the phusibilit) of calegon/.ing him as a charismatic Icader. 
The following qucstions were asked. firstly, how WJS RlIthe le/i ~ble to su["cessfully 
mobilizc around ethnicity mxl se~ondly. how <lid he gain legitinlate acccss to st~te patronage? 
The hypolhesis presented 11\ lh~ bteginning of this thesis suggests that his chil!ism~lk 
personal ity assisted him with regards to successfully mobilizing il!ound ethnicil)." ~nd with 
lhat of gaining legitimate access to state resources . EmpiriCJI evidence in lhe form of 
personal testimonies on the part 01' Bulhe!e/i's slIpporters and those othcrs who could 
conllnent on lhe nalur~ 01' lh~ relationship which appeared to exist between himself ~nd his 
followers was ex~millCd. Based on this evidence it was found th~t it is irKked pl~usihl e to 
categori"c Buthe!ezi as a charisl11Jtic leader. It is ~rgued in the le>.110 folio" th"-l lluthclczi' s 
charism~ ~Iongside of ~en~in social, polilical and economic structural conditions which 
prevailcd at the timc, workcd to facilitate his success ~s fJr JS etlmic mohi ii".ation was 
concerned. In addition to tltis, it is argued fUlthcrmore th~t although Buthelezi did eng~ge in 
palronage pol l tics. his di Sf"'nsing of m~teri~ 1 resources or favours cannot he described as the 
oniy way in which he obtained loyalty frol11 his supporters. 
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Mangosuthll BlIthclezi: A biographical sketch 
'v1an!?osutliu (iilbllil Rllthelezi '\'as born into Lulu royalt)' ol111lOO 27" 
of Augu,t of 1928 ill 'v1ahlabathini I. His mOlh~r, Cl~lstUilee Magogo 
Zulu, was th ~ dall!?hkr of King DillizuJu und granddau!?hb or King 
Cebhwayo, lIis father, Cllicn"ilthol~ lluthelezi. w,,, the grent 
grandson of Mnyammm lluthelc~L ,,110 W<lS Prime Minister to King 
C ,,,,;;;;;;;7. Mangostltlill Bmllclui ~ompl eted his >eeondury education from 1944 10 1 947 at 
Adam, Colleg~ in Amunzimtoti. where he matriculated), From 1948 to 1950 he moved on to 
,tud} hi,tory and n<lti,e administration at tile Uni"ersi t} "floort Hare in Ali~e ill the Eu,tern 
Cupe'. His fellow University alumlli induded renow1led political figurcs su<:11 as Oli\'er 
Tilmbo. Govan Mb<:ki. Nc1wn Mundcla and Robert Sohukwel. The latter formed part ofthc 
Al\C youth league at Fort I lill"". <IS did lluthc1ezi", 
In 1950 lluthdc7.i joined other students in proteSiing <lg<lill;;t the >ehedu1cd visit of (Jo,-crnor 
(j~ner<ll (j Rraml Van Zyl <lnd fl)r his actions hc was cxpel led from the Unil'er;;il/. 
1 Un i .. e" ily of KwoZu lu Nolol n.d 
• Ibid 
' South Alrie"n Il i'tory Onlille n.d 
, Ibid 
• Th e Pre ,idency Republ ic of s.outh Afri,. n.d, (Profil<: of Ullil'.r>ity of fort Harel 
' Norl,. 11993, 76 
' Sou lh African Hi,lory Online nod 
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Despite his expulsion, the University permitted him to attend the necessary lectures and to 
write examinations8. In the period in which Buthelezi completed his tertiary education, Fort 
Hare was known as the most prestigious black higher education institution in both southern 
and eastern Africa9• It was out of this prestigious academic background that Buthelezi 
emerged. 
From 1951-52 Buthelezi was employed to perform clerical work in the Department of Bantu 
Administration in DurbanlO. The 2nd July of 1952 saw him marry Irene Audrey Thandekile 
Mzila, who was employed as a nurse and with her he fathered three sons and four 
daughters II. During this same year he also worked at 'Cowley and Cowley' Attorneys in 
Durban, where he again undertook clerical work 12 . In 1953 he was made acting chief of the 
Buthelezis' by the Apartheid Government 13 • 1957 Saw him being made the fully recognized 
chief of the Buthelezi tribe, a position which he still enjoys todayl4. 
Buthelezi became the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of the KwaZulu Territorial Authority 
(KTA) which was situated in Nongoma, in the year of 197015 . In 1972 the ZTA morphed 
8 1bid 
9 The Presidency: Republic of South Africa n.d (Profile of University of Fort Hare) 
10 Government Communication and Information System 2002 
11 South African History Online n.d 
12 Government Communication and Information System 2002 
13 Mza1a 1988, 69 
14 South African History Online n.d 
15 Government Communication and Information System 2000 
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into the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly (KLA)16. Buthelezi was CEO of the KLA until 
197617. This assembly afforded the homeland of KwaZulu a limited degree of executive and 
legislative powers and it received the support of the Apartheid government, as it was viewed 
as facilitating the eventual move towards an entirely self-governing homeland which the 
central government desired 18. 
On the 21 51 March of 1975 at K waN zimela, an area III Northern K waZ ul u, the Inkatha 
National Cultural Liberation Movement was born, with Chief Buthelezi at its helm 19. 
According to Buthelezi, the majority of those who played a role in the establishment of 
Inkatha were former African National Congress(ANC) officials or political activists, who on 
the banning of their organization together with that of the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC), 
decided to respond by creating a new organization20. Examples cited of former ANC 
members who then became part of the group that founded Inkatha include; Dr. Frank T. 
Mdlalose and the late Rt. Rev. Bishop Dr. A. H. Zulu21 . 
16 Inkatha Freedom Party 1999 (Biographies) 
17 Government Communication and Information System 2000 
18 Mare and Hamilton 1987,41 
19 Inkatha Freedom Party n.d (Historical background) 
20 Ibid 
21 Ibid 
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A year after the inception of the second Inkatha, Buthelezi became Chief Minister of 
K waZulu, a position he occupied until 199422 • 
The 1980's saw Buthelezi being praised abroad and on the receiving end of many an award. 
In 1981 he received the French National Order of Merit, in 1982 the George Meaney Human 
Rights Award, 1983 saw him receiving the Apostle of Peace award which was presented by 
Pandit Satyapal Sharma of India23. By way of contrast, at home he was labelled as a 
collaborator to the Apartheid government by many black South Africans in particular, who 
believed that he was utilizing the Apartheid system and its exploitative devices so as further 
his own career aspirations24 • Buthelezi was both anti-sanctions and anti-unions and in 
addition to this, he spoke out against armed struggle, all of which members of the United 
Democratic Front supported (UDFi5• Where Buthelezi argued that the way to topple the 
Apartheid regime was to work within the confines of the system, the UDF believed that 
armed struggle was in fact necessary to bring the regime to its knees26 . 
n Government Communication and Information System 2000 
23 Ibid 
24 Norval 1993, 77 
25 Jeffery 1997, 32 
26 Ibid 
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The early 1990's saw Buthelezi representing Inkatha which became known as the Inkatha 
Freedom Party (lFP) in peace talks with the African National Congress (ANC) and the 
National Party (Np)27. 
In 1994, after South Africa's first ever democratic election Buthelezi was part of a 
government of national unity (GNU), Nelson Mandela of the ANC and F.W. De Klerk of the 
NP were the other constituents of the GNU28 • After the 1994 election Buthelezi served as 
Minister of Home Affairs for two terms and in 1998 he was made acting president by Nelson 
Mandela, who went to Washington for a Congressional Order29 . During Mandela' s absence 
Buthelezi authorized South Africa's military interference in Lesotho so as to stabilize their 
elected government, which was on shaky ground30• In the period which has followed from 
this, Buthelezi's party has been securing fewer votes in the country's national, democratic 
elections and as such, it appears that thus far his status as a national figure is in decline3l . 
27 South African History Online n.d 
28 Ibid 
29 Ibid 
30 Ibid 
31 Independent Electoral Commission 2004 
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Introduction 
How can we systematically explain Mangosuthu Buthelezi's emergence as a national leader 
during South Africa's Apartheid era? Why in the country's democratic context thus far, has 
his status changed? These are the two overarching questions to be addressed in the following 
text. 
Buthelezi captured my interest because of the fact that at one point in South Africa's history 
he seemed to be loved by a few and hated by many. He was awarded the title of collaborator 
by some of the UDF supporters because of his choice to operate within the confines of the 
Apartheid System32• In addition, he was implicated in many of the cases of human rights 
abuse which came before the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) and in turn was 
found to be guilty in some instances. Despite these occurrences he is currently a member of 
parliament and is treated with a high degree of respect by many of his fellow 
parliamentarians. It stands out in my mind that there is something about him which gives 
him such 'staying power'. 
Much of the literature which I had read on Buthelezi prior to the completion of this thesis, 
centred upon the manner in which he had engaged with ethnic manipulation and with the 
dispensing of patronage to Zulu people. I began thinking about the process of ethnic 
manipulation and about that which makes it successful. 
32 Norval 1993, 77 
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When reading on this topic, much was said about the nature of those who are susceptible to 
ethnic manipulation, but very little was written about those who were doing the manipulating. 
In my mind there must have been something about Buthelezi that made people listen to him 
and susceptible to manipulation in the first instance, along with the other structural conditions 
which heightened their susceptibility. It was my belief that Buthelezi was able to engage in 
successful ethnic manipulation because of his charismatic personality. The purpose of this 
thesis was to test the before mentioned hypothesis. Could a case in fact be made to support 
the belief that Buthelezi possessed a charismatic leadership style during South Africa's 
Apartheid era? 
10 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
Research Methodology 
The Research Method 
This thesis examines three key themes these are; charismatic leadership, ethnicity and its 
manipulation and patronage. These themes are examined in light of the role which each of 
them played in facilitating Buthelezi's emergence as a key national figure during South 
Africa's Apartheid era and his subsequent decline in stature, in the country's current 
democratic context. The core focus of this thesis was that of determining whether or not 
Buthelezi could be classified as a charismatic leader during the time of Apartheid. 
Explanations provided in the literature which suggest that he ascended to power as a result of 
his ethnic manipulation and his use of patronage are plentiful however, very little exists 
which speaks to Buthelezi's possession of charisma. Where information which speaks 
directly to Buthelezi' s manipulation of ethnicity and his use of patronage is easily obtainable, 
information relating directly to his use of charisma is not and as such, a more adventurous 
research strategy was required. 
The broad literature on charisma was explored and from this three indicators which provide 
assistance in the classification of charismatic leaders were identified. These indicators are 
inclusive of the following; the charismatic leader engenders high levels of trust and loyalty 
from hislher followers and in addition to this, when the followers are in the presence of the 
said leader, they lose their own sense of individual will as it becomes synonymous with that 
of their leader' S33. 
33 Willner 1984, 28-29 
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With the indicators which could be used to identify a charismatic leader identified, the next 
step was that of assessing whether or not it was possible to categorize Buthelezi in this way. 
In order to determine the level of trust, loyalty and the lack of personal will experienced by 
Buthelezi's supporters, it was necessary to examine their personal testimonies to extract the 
required information. Possibly the best way to have obtained this information would haye 
been to interview a sample group of people who supported Buthelezi however, certain 
limitations prohibited me from undertaking this task. This would have been an incredibly 
time consuming and expensive exercise given that I would have been the sole person 
conducting and transcribing the interviews. With these practical constraints in mind the most 
suitable alternative appeared to be that of sourcing personal testimonies on the part of 
Buthelezi's supporters or those who could comment on them, in an already existing literary 
form. 
The Dataset on Charismatic Leadership 
With the three indicators of charismatic leadership which were obtained from the broader 
literature on the subject in mind (loyalty, trust, loss of personal will), the next step was that of 
searching for empirical evidence which would either support Buthelezi' s classification as a 
charismatic leader, or in fact reveal the uncharismatic nature of his leadership. Put 
differently, was there evidence to suggest that Buthelezi's supporters trusted him, were loyal 
to him and in addition, experienced a loss of their own personal will as a result of his 
influence? 
12 
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It was my contention that I would locate evidence which could support Buthelezi being 
classified as a charismatic leader in the personal testimonies of those who had been party to 
some form of violence. During incidents of violence one would assume that one's true 
loyalties would be exposed in addition to revealing those persons which you deem 
trustworthy. With this in mind I turned to the literature which spoke to the so-called Natal 
Violence which occurred during the 1980's and early 1990's. Some of the evidence which 
was used in an attempt to determine the plausibility of classifYing Buthelezi as a charismatic 
leader was found in the work of Matthew Kentridge (1990) in his book entitled, 'An 
Unofficial War: Inside the conflict in Pietermaritzburg'. Kentridge's book examines the 
violence which occurred in the Pietermaritzburg region during the 1980's in particular. His 
primary focus is on the people who were affected by the violence and as such, detailed 
descriptions of events experienced by individuals/groups are given pride of place. The work 
of John Aitchison, who co-authored a book entitled, 'The role of Political Violence in South 
Africa's Democratisation', was also examined for evidence to either support or negate the 
charismatic leadership hypothesis. Aitchison, like Kentridge also has much evidence in the 
way of personal testimony which proved to be useful. 
A survey which was conducted by Brewer (1980) in KwaMashu was also examined. The 
purpose of his survey was to determine the degree to which a congruency existed between the 
views of Buthelezi and those of his supporters34• A sample group of Zulu males, who 
possessed legal residential rights in KwaMashu, was taken and multi-stage sampling was 
performed so as to achieve randomization35. This survey was most useful in that it offered 
34 Brewer 1985, 57 
35 Ibid, 58 
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statistical evidence which could speak to the degree to which Buthelezi's supporters had 
internalized his ideological views. 
The literary source which was most utilized for the purpose of attaining empirical evidence 
which either supported or negated the hypothesis that Buthelezi possessed charisma was that 
of Volume three, chapter three of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission's Report (1998). 
This specific chapter focuses on the Natal violence and detailed descriptions of violent events 
and of the perceptions of those engaging in the violence are provided in a case by case 
format. 
Limitations of the Study 
As mentioned the core focus of this thesis was on the possibility of classifying Buthelezi as a 
charismatic leader. A number of secondary sources were consulted in a bid to ascertain 
information which would speak to this. The intention was to make a case for the inclusion of 
Buthelezi's charismatic leadership style in the explanations which are given for his ascent to 
power during the Apartheid era and his subsequent decline in status in South Africa's current 
democratic context. 
In no way is the argument being made which suggests that the explanations which focus on 
Buthelezi's use of ethnic manipulation and of patronage are without merit. 
14 
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However, what is being suggested is that charisma ought to be considered when offering 
explanations as to the reasons behind Buthelezi' s ascent to power during Apartheid and his 
subsequent decline in stature in South Africa's democratic environment. 
A stronger case for Buthelezi's possession of charisma or lack thereof could have been made 
if individuals who supported him during the time frame studied in this thesis had been 
interviewed, however as mentioned, the resources to undertake such a task were unavailable. 
The task undertaken in this thesis proved to be much smaller. The purpose of this text was 
that of ascertaining from the literature, whether or not a case could be made for Buthelezi's 
possession of charisma and in addition, this thesis also sought to determine if the evidence 
provided would be convincing enough to allow for an alternate explanation of Buthelezi's 
ascent to power and his subsequent decline in stature to be offered. 
Chapter One: Review of the literature 
The literature pertaining to Buthelezi's emergence as a key national politician in Apartheid 
South Africa and on his subsequent decline in the democratic context to retain this status may 
be divided into three categories. There are those authors such as Butler, Rotberg, Adams, 
Schlemmer and Muil, who focus on Buthelezi's use of what they perceive to be a realistic 
and moderate political strategy, to explain his rise to power. Others such as De Haas, Golan, 
Campbell and Mare, argue that his power emanated from his successful engagement with the 
process of ethnic mobilization. 
15 
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The third literary school in the context of this text includes such writers as Berman, Charney 
and Szeftel. The focus is on the manner in which Buthelezi used both ethnic manipulation 
and the practice of patronage politics to glean political power. 
A realistic and moderate strategy 
Butler, Rotberg and Adams in their book entitled, 'The Black Homelands of South Africa' -
(1977), argue that Buthelezi's rise to power was based upon support garnered through his 
pursuit of a non-violent strategy to create a multi-racial South Africa36 , This strategy was 
based on the following key factors, 
Firstly, Buthelezi is described as having effectively utilized the opposition press in particular, 
to force the government to respond publicly to concerns raised with respect to the policy of 
separate development37 , Mention is made of the fact that Buthelezi was the first African 
politician to arrange press conferences after he met with the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly, 
or with the Executive Council38 , He also wrote a twice monthly column entitled 'Through 
African Eyes', which appeared in the Rand Daily Mail (Johannesburg), the Eastern Province 
Herald (Port Elizabeth), the Natal Mercury (Durban), the Cape Times (Cape Town), the Daily 
Dispatch (East London) and the Sunday Times (Johannesburg), which expressed his political 
views and kept the question of the credibility of the policy of separate development on the 
36 Butler, Rotberg and Adams 1977, 78 
37 Ibid, 83 
38 Ibid 
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agenda for both black and white individuals39. Emanating from this they claim, was 
Buthelezi's ability to enter into dialogue with white party representatives, where in their view 
other black leaders such as Albert Luthuli had failed4o . 
The second part of Buthelezi's strategy concerned that of his refusal to accept independence 
for KwaZulu partly because of its poor economic situation and its limited land capacity41. 
With respect to the land constraints which KwaZulu experienced, the government had agreed 
to transfer an additional 163 000 hectares to the homeland in its consolidation proposals of 
1972 and 1973 42. The port city of Richards Bay, the lucrative Hluhluwe Game Reserve and 
Eshowe (former administrative capital of Zululand) were not to be included in the land 
destined for transfer43 . Buthelezi refused to partake in the process of land consolidation as 
according to him, the Zulu people had not been consulted on the matter and the entire 
situation suggested baaskap and therefore, it was stated that he would not participate to 
secure the white supremacist ambitions of the Apartheid government44. According to this 
account, Buthelezi was particularly angered by the failure to include Richards Bay in the land 
to be transferred to KwaZulu and he viewed this as indicative of the government's plan to 
ensure that K waZulu would not be a viable state if independent45 . 
39 Ibid, 84 
40 Ibid, 80 
41 Ibid, 93 & 97 
42 Ibid, 93 
43 Ibid 
44 1bid 
45 Ibid, 95 
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In addition to this, mention was also made of Buthelezi's public outcry which concerned the 
awarding of non-arable land to black sugar-cane farmers and the transfer of fertile land in 
KwaZulu, to white sugar-cane farmers46• With respect to KwaZulu's economic development, 
Buthelezi's desire to rid the homeland of the presence of the Bantu Investment Corporation is 
discussed47• This body was tasked with the advertising of businesses in KwaZulu and with 
the buying and selling of them48. Buthelezi saw this body as serving white interests rather 
than black and he decried the fact that no input from the Zulu people had been permitted with 
regards to investment in the homeland49 • In addition, he sought to be able to receive foreign 
loans for the purpose of developing the homeland in its own capacity, without having to 
consult Pretoriaso. 
The third aspect of Buthelezi's strategy to improve the quality of life for all black people and 
to create a multi-racial South Africa concerned educationsl . In 1953 the policy of Bantu 
education was instituted, which required that the first six years of a child's schooling be 
provided in their own mother-tongue and thereafter classes would be given in a dual-medium 
formatS2 • In 1973, as a result of the high degree of autonomy given to homeland leaders with 
respect to both the school curriculum and staff composition (not including financial control, 
46 Ibid 
47 Ibid, 99 
48 Ibid 
49 Ibid 
50 Ibid 
sllbid,104 
S2 Ibid, 111 
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finances gleaned from Pretoria), legislation was passed in KwaZulu which required all 
students to be taught in English53, The belief was that if students were not taught in English 
they would not be able to secure for themselves successful employment at a later stage54, 
Buthelezi set about arguing with Pretoria that if those Zulus who were living in urban areas 
such as Soweto, were in fact citizens of KwaZulu then they should be sUbjected to KwaZulu 
legislation, which required that they be taught in English55, 
According to Butler, Rotberg and Adams, Buthelezi's choice to operate within the Apartheid 
structures afforded him the opportunity to interact with those who held political sway, His 
public appearances and the fact that he was operating within the confines of the law 
translated into the government being unable to approach him in a dismissive fashion56 , As 
such, he was able to pursue his strategy of empowering black people step by step, addressing 
each issue as it presented itself57, Attention was given to the support Buthelezi gained not 
only from black people, but that which he gained from white quarters as he set about 
placating their fears about imminent black aggression, as a result of white minority rule58, 
53 Ibid 
54 Ibid 
55 Ibid, 112 
56 Ibid, 80 
57 Ibid, 81 
58 Ibid, 78 
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To summarize, these authors argued that Buthelezi's moderate strategy, which they perceived 
to be that of attaining a multi-racial South Africa through non-violent means, was the reason 
behind his emergence as a key political figure. 
The arguments posited by Butler, Rotberg and Adams speak of Buthelezi in a more 
sympathetic light. This may be explained by turning to the historical context in which they 
were writing. Their book was published in 1977 and prior to this time, the ANC had been 
weakened. As discussed in the contextual chapter, the infiltration of the MK (Military wing 
of the African National Congress-ANC) structures by the South African Security Forces at 
Lilliesleaf farm in 1963, put an end to their plan to overthrow the government, the plan was 
dubbed 'Operation Mayibuye,59. In addition to this, many of their influential leaders such as 
Nelson Mandela were prosecuted and then imprisoned after the Rivonia trials6o. These events 
resulted in a political vacuum occurring in South Africa as a result of the weakening of the 
ANC and it was at this point, that Buthelezi founded Inkatha61 • His moderate strategy in the 
wake of the ANC's presumed failure appeared realistic and he created an extremely public 
personality for himself both domestically and abroad62 . 
These authors were writing III the period pnor to the 1979 London meeting between 
Buthelezi and members of the ANC in exile. 
59 Jeffery 1997, 19 
60 Norval1993, 27 & 29 
61 Ibid, 30 
62 Jeffery 1997, 21 
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It was after this meeting (discussed in the contextual chapter) that a more concrete divide 
between Inkatha and the ANC emerged, after which violent exchanges between members of 
both parties became more frequent and Buthelezi's 'moderate' strategy was publicly 
challenged63 . With respect to this, the non-violent stance of Buthelezi which the authors 
discuss came under public attack when he was accused of inciting his supporters to attack 
members of the ANC64. In light of information pertaining to Buthelezi which became evident 
after the writing of their book, their argument is less convincing and remains applicable only 
in a certain historical context. 
Schlemmer and Muil in their book entitled, 'Social and political change in the African areas: 
A case study of KwaZulu' - (1975), argue that Buthelezi's emergence as a key political figure 
also rested upon his use of strategy, specifically his use of an inclusive strategy65. He made 
appeals to Black Nationalism, calling for homeland unity made manifest through a Union of 
Black States66, In addition to this, he promoted Zulu Nationalism and often made appeals to 
Zulu kings of old. His political party, Inkatha, was described as espousing the same goals 
that its predecessor, Inkatha kaZulu, born in the early 1920's did, namely that of fostering 
Zulu unity and of the cultivation of a sense of responsibility on the part of Zulu people, 
toward other South African races67. 
63 Ibid, 32 
64De Haas & Zulu 1994,441 
65 Schlemmer and Muil, 124 
66 Ibid, 123 
67 Ibid 
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According to them Buthelezi also embraced the ideology of Black Consciousness, which 
aimed to free the minds of black individuals from white domination68 . In addition to 
embracing Black Nationalism, Zulu unity and Black Consciousness, Buthelezi also addressed 
Coloured and Indian people69 . The latter is indicative of the eclectic ideology which 
Buthelezi promulgated. He acknowledged that Coloured people suffered under the Apartheid 
regime and committed himself to their cause, whilst stating that he was aware of the fact that 
as groups they possessed their own individual concems70. Buthelezi also included white 
people in his strategy, regarding this, he made it known that K waZulu was open to 'white 
ZUIUS,71. 
The authors acknowledged that from certain sectors of the black population, from the black 
intelligentsia in particular, Buthelezi received much criticism 72. Some of this criticism 
emanated from the fact that Buthelezi adopted an anti-disinvestment and striking stance with 
respect to South Africa73 , Buthelezi was made leader of the most fragmented homeland, 
which was plagued by unemployment and factional fighting74. Mention was made of the 
many appeals that Buthelezi made overseas for investment in K waZulu and of the manner in 
which he set about publicly criticising financial disinvestment from South Africa, in a bid to 
58 Ibid 
59 Ibid 
70 Ibid 
71 Ibid, 124 
72 Ibid, 114 
73 Ibid 
74 Ibid, 111 
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illustrate dissatisfaction with the South African government75 , He criticized Zulu workers 
who engaged in striking activity as he believed that this activity was a disincentive to foreign 
investment in the region76 , In addition to the unpopularity that Buthelezi met with from the 
broader liberation movement, as a result of his anti-financial disinvestment stance, he also 
received criticism when he called on the South African Police Force to assist him in 
stabilizing the factional conflict in Msinga in KwaZulu77 , In this area in particular, factional 
fighting, which refers to kin loyalties being played out with respect to disagreements over 
minor issues, occurred frequently78, Disinvestment and factional fighting were not the only 
challenges which Buthelezi faced, Mention was made of the former national government 
officials' attempts to incite homeland residents and to direct their frustration toward the 
homeland leaders 79, 
Despite his unpopularity within the broad liberation movement as a result of his anti-
disinvestment campaign, his appeal to the SAPF for assistance and the attempts made by 
certain former government officials to stir up animosity toward him, he nevertheless won a 
great deal of support through his inclusive strateglO, The authors refer to research which 
was carried out by an advertising research company called, Quadrant, which posed a question 
75 Ibid, 114 
76 Ibid 
77 Ibid, 116 
78 Ibid 
79 Ibid, 117 
80 Ibid, 124 
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to a sample group of black people in Soweto 81. The question was as follows, 'Which person 
do you admire most'? Buthelezi's name was mentioned most often82 , The authors also cite 
the many public appearances that Buthelezi made where he spoke to crowds of 10 000 or 
more, who had come to hear his political views as evidence in support of their popularity 
claim83 , 
Schlemmer and Muil's argument pertaining to the success of Buthelezi as a result of his 
inclusive strategy, like that of Butler, Rotberg and Adam's is also limited to a particular 
historical context. Their book was published in 1975 prior to events that were to unfold 
which would call the sincerity of Buthelezi's inclusive strategy into question, It may be said 
that for a short period of time, Buthelezi's inclusive strategy did provide him with success in 
that he gained white approval through allaying their fears of possible black retaliation and he 
gained the support of many black people, as is evidenced by the number of supporters who 
attended his rallies, by publicly challenging Pretoria with regards to their policiesR4 , 
However, just a short while after the printing of this book in 1975, after the London meeting 
referred to, violence engulfed the country and his inclusive strategy no longer appeared as 
inclusive particularly due to the endemic violence which persisted between Inkatha and 
members of the ANC85, It was not his addressing of the discriminatory policies of Apartheid 
in an 'issue by issue' format that resulted in the degree of success he obtained and sustained 
81 Ibid, 120 & 121 
82 Ibid, 121 
83 Ibid, 120 
84 Schlemmer and Muil1975, 130 & 120 
85 Jeffery 1997, 32 
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for a length of time, nor was it his 'inclusive strategy'. Both of these arguments prove to be 
limited and they become difficult to sustain in light of the historical developments which 
occurred after they were published. 
Ethnic mobilization 
De Haas, Paulus Zulu, Golan, Campbell, Mare and Walker are all in agreement with respect 
to the belief that Buthelezi utilized the process of ethnic mobilization to garner support. 
Ethnicity in the context of the texts referred to, is not understood in the primordial sense, 
rather, ethnic identities are perceived to be socially constructed. Ethnic mobilization is 
understood to be a process in which ethnicity is made salient, so as to provide the political 
broker with the necessary power to achieve his/her political ends86 , 
De Haas and Zulu in their article entitled, 'Ethnicity and federalism: The case of 
KwaZululNatal' - (J 994), focus specifically on the manner in which Buthelezi set about 
creating the situation in which the Zulu nation and Inkatha became synonymous with one 
another87 . They describe the manner in which rallies were utilized to extol this message. At 
these rallies such as the one held in Clermont, Durban in 1986, ceremonial dances such as the 
reed dance were conducted and posters communicating the way in which Chief Buthelezi was 
setting about acquiring for the Zulu people more land, homes and working for their freedom 
86Campbell, Mare and Walker 1995, 288 
87 De Haas and Zulu 1994,438 
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adorned the venue88 , The presence of the Zulu king alongside of Buthelezi at many of these 
rallies and at other events sanctioned Inkatha, making membership of alternate opposition 
movements appear disloyal to the Zulu royal family and to Zulu culture89 , The extensive 
press coverage that these rallies received did much to perpetuate the belief that being Zulu 
translated into you being a member of Inkatha90 , As one example in support of this, they 
refer to an instance in which Robin Carlisle, who was the National Secretary of the 
Progressive Federal Party (PFP), spoke of Chief Buthelezi as having a constituency of 6, 000, 
000 ZUlUS91 , 
Golan's focus in her journal article entitled, '1nkatha and its use of the Zulu past' - (1991), is 
on Buthelezi's use of a specific reading of Zulu history, so as to build a constituency92, In her 
view the reading of history promulgated by Buthelezi, enabled his engagement with the 
process of ethnic manipulation93 , In support of her argument she refers to Inkatha's revision 
of the school curriculum in KwaZulu in 197894 , A subject known as Ubunto Botho (Good 
Citizen) was added to the syllabus95 , Ubunto Botho was taught for an hour a week to all 
grade levels96, The aim of the subject was to make known to the students the ideology of 
88 Ibid 
89 Ibid 
90 Ibid 
91 Ibid 
92 Golan 1991, 114 
93 Ibid 
94 Ibid, 120 
95 Ibid 
96 Ibid 
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Inkatha and to assist them in understanding the 'true' version of history, the version of history 
espoused by Buthelezi97 . The texts for Ubunto Botho were written in Zulu, which Golan 
suggests resulted in ethnicity becoming salient98 • She argues that the language of instruction 
was used as a political tool in South Africa99 • Regarding this, mention is made of how black 
people fought to be taught in English as opposed to in their 'tribal' languages, so as to secure 
for themselves better employment opportunities lOo • Contrary to the views expressed earlier 
by Butler, Rotberg and Adams, who claimed that Buthelezi joined in this fight against being 
taught in the ethnic languages, Golan claims that Buthelezi was in fact assisting the Apartheid 
state with their policy of separate development, by teaching a subject in ZU1U 101 . 
She argues that Shaka and his warrior status received pride of place in the Ubunto Botho 
texts lO2 • His demolition of other tribes was celebrated and he was recognized as heroic for 
uniting the Zulu people lO3 • Emphasis was also placed on the manner in which Inkatha was 
set to carry on with Shaka's mission to unite all Zulu people104 . In addition, attention was 
given in Inkatha's historical accounts, not just in school texts but also at public gatherings, to 
individual leaders in Zulu history, thus creating the belief that individuals have the capability 
97 1bid 
98 Ibid, 121 
99 Ibid 
100 Ibid 
101 Ibid 
102 Ibid 
103 Ibid 
104 Ibid 
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to achieve great ends and to change the course of historylO5. Buthelezi's focus on teaching 
Inkatha's version of history in schools from an early age, his referral to great leaders such as 
Shaka and his heroic nation-building, which Buthelezi revealed would be continued by 
lnkatha, according to Golan, all did much to create a constituency who were open to ethnic 
appeals I 06. 
Campbell, Mare and Walker in their article, 'Evidence for an ethnic identity in the life 
histories of Zulu-speaking Durban township residents' - (1995), argue that Buthelezi was 
able to achieve success with regards to ethnic mobilization, because his reading of Zulu 
history resonated with desires ordinary people experienced in their personal lives lO7. Like 
Golan, these authors refer to Buthelezi's reading of Zulu history which emphasizes the 
legendary Zulu warriors such as Shaka in particular, together with Cetshwayo and 
Dingane lO8. In support of their argument, they refer to a series of twenty four open-ended life 
histories of Zulu people residing in Umlazi Township in Durban in the early 1990's. They 
claim that all of their respondents were ignorant with respect to being able to provide detailed 
information on Shaka or on any of the other warriors Buthelezi often referred to10'l. 
However, they point to the fact that these respondents noted that they would like their own 
children to be taught the reading of history promulgated by Buthelezi, despite the fact that 
105 Ibid, 124 
106 Ibid, 120 
107 Campbell, Mare and Walker 1995, 294 
108 Ibid, 293 
109 Ibid 
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they could not offer detailed information on Shaka or CetshwayoJlo. Despite the 
respondent's lack of knowledge regarding the warriors of old, Buthelezi's appeals to a 
glorious Zulu past resonated in a real way with the everyday lives of ordinary Zulu people, 
many of whom were poverty-stricken))). Buthelezi's 'blazing trail of chiefs and warriors' 
reminded Zulu people of the time when they were not oppressed and were able to live their 
lives with dignity 1I2. His reading of history resonated with ordinary people as it referred to a 
time in which social order and stability reigned and this permitted him to achieve success 
with respect to the process of ethnic mobilization ll3 . 
The argument posited by de Haas and Zulu, Golan and Campbell et aI, which claims that 
Buthelezi ascended to power through the process of ethnic mobilization is convincing, in that 
much evidence is provided in support of his involvement with ethnic manipUlation. 
However, their arguments focus on the process of ethnic mobilization and do not in a 
substantial manner, appear to address the matter of the characteristics of the person who is 
implementing the process. As such their argument appears to be incomplete. If ethnic 
mobilization is to be viewed simply as a process that is implemented and which results in the 
successful acquisition of power, then would we not see more instances of it occurring? 
Expressed differently, what makes ethnic manipulation successful? Surely the nature of the 
person who is engaging in ethnic manipulation must feature in the answer to such a question. 
These authors suggest that Buthelezi became successful through his manipulation of ethnicity 
110 Ibid 
111 Ibid, 293 
112 Ibid, 294 
113 Ibid 
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however; if he was not a charismatic individual would he have been able to achieve success 
through the process of ethnic mobilization? It is noted that Campbell, Mare and Walker do 
add somewhat of a qualifier to the process of ethnic manipulation, when they state that the 
process is successful when claims by the political entrepreneur resonate in some way with 
those who are being manipulated however, in focusing on the process and those who are 
being manipulated, they do not appear to address the matter of analysing the nature of the 
person who is responsible for the implementation of the process in the first place l14 , 
Patronage 
Buthelezi and patronage in the South African context 
Charney argues in 'Vigilantes, clientelism, and the South African State' ~ (1991), that the 
Inkatha movement, before the onset of democracy in South Africa, represented the 'most 
h ' f l' l' "h 115 compre enSlVe system 0 c Iente Ism III t e country . Clientelism is defined as a 
phenomenon in which relationships are created between patrons and clients, which are 
characterized by dependency I 16, The exchange of goods or protection is offered by the 
patron to the client, in exchange for obedience or labourll7, This kind of relationship may 
develop inside or outside of public offices I 18, 
114 Campbell, Mare and Walker 1995, 294 
115 Charney 1991, 10 
116 Ibid, 9 
117 Ibid 
118 Charney 1991, 9 
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lnkatha is described as a cartel comprising of Zulu chiefs and of urban bossesll9, Buthelezi's 
former control of both the rural areas and of the city townships, together with his possession 
of a high degree of coercive power, resulted in him having the largest patronage network of 
all of the African Homelands120, According to Charney, the movement's control of travel 
documents, healthcare, police, pensions, education and flood relief, assisted them in their 
acquisition of a constituency numbering over a millionl21 , Inkatha's control of patronage in 
KwaZulu is cited by him as the primary reason behind the calm which pervaded the area at a 
time when the rest of the country was in revolt after the 1976 Soweto uprisings (see 
contextual chapter)I22, During the early 1980's, the high level of support previously enjoyed 
by lnkatha began to wanel23, With respect to this, the political instability of the 1980's, the 
economic inefficiency experienced as a result of the colour bar together with the 
implementation of foreign sanctions resulted in capital flight and a foreign debt crisis l24, 
These events led to the country experiencing economic regression, which limited the capacity 
which the state had to continue to supply collaborating patrons with the resources they 
needed to maintain their clientelistic networks 125, Emanating from these events, Charney 
argues, was Buthelezi's move toward the use of coercion in a bid to maintain his 
constituency, which in tum he suggests, resulted in Inkatha's dwindling support l26 , 
119 Ibid, 10 
120 Ibid 
121 Ibid 
122 Ibid 
123 Ibid, 11 
124 Ibid, 3 
125 Ibid 
126 Ibid, 11 
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Charney's argument proves to be problematic in that he attributes Buthelezi's success solely 
to his control over a vast network of patronage and to his reliance upon coercive powerl27. 
Buthelezi's supporters in this context appear to be loyal through fear and the need to attain 
material resources. He describes Inkatha as a cartel, suggesting that Buthelezi is akin to a 
'mob' boss or the like. This reading of him appears to be extremely narrow and superficial. 
Charney appears to have engaged in a mono-causal fallacy, Buthelezi is a complex figure and 
to simply assert that he only achieved support as a result of his criminal behaviour and the 
lack of agency on the part of his supporters is problematic. The majority of the people in 
South Africa during the time of Apartheid feared the coercive capacity of the NP 
government, at the same time they were reliant on this same government for employment and 
access to other resources. However, this did not curb attempts to fight against the status quo 
and the transition to democracy did eventually occur. To assert that supporters offered 
loyalty to Buthelezi as they were frozen by fear and committed to him through material need 
does not appear to be an extremely convincing argument. 
The hypothesis which is tested in this thesis is that of whether Buthelezi may be categorized 
as a charismatic leader, which would assist in explaining his ascent to power. Evidence in 
support of this claim may also partially explain the success which he enjoyed as far as the 
process of ethnic mobilization is concerned. Whilst his practice of patronage politics is not 
discounted, Charney's argument does not appear to explain in an entirely convincing manner, 
the reasons behind Buthelezi's ascent to power. 
127 Charney 1991, 10 
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Szeftel in his journal article, 'Ethnicity and democratization in South Africa' - (J 994), argues 
against the view that Buthelezi achieved success solely through his engagement with the 
process of ethnic mobilization128 • He claims that whilst ethnic mobilization did have a role to 
play, Buthelezi's control of the patronage structures of KwaZulu ought not to be discounted 
in attempts to explain his rise to powerl29. Szeftel argues that patron-client relationships in 
Africa in particular, often times become imbued with ethnic symbols in an attempt to provide 
leaders with support13o.He uses the following example to illustrate the manner in which 
clientelistic relationships assume an ethnic dimension. He refers to the homeland system 
which existed in South Africa in which elites, while dependent on the state for access to 
resources, were empowered in that they controlled the patronage network of their specific 
homeland J3J. For the clients of these patrons, obedience to the homeland leaders became the 
only way in which they were able to secure work, land and other resourcesJ32. The limited 
resources and the tight control exercised over them by homeland leaders, particularly with 
respect to land, resulted in the prevalence of jealously and resentment around the distribution 
of these resources J33. The awarding of scarce resources took on an ethnic dimension 134. 
128Szeftel 1994, 196 
129 Ibid 
130 Ibid 
131 Ibid, 192 
132 Ibid 
133 Ibid 
134 Ibid 
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In K waZulu it was the case that Zulu councillors were removed from office if they were 
found to be selling or renting plots to Pondos 135• In addition, new housing projects were 
restricted to Zulu people and Pondos were not entitled to be involvedl36 . Through Buthelezi"s 
awarding of patronage to Zulu people as opposed to the Pondo in particular, he gained the 
support of the dominant group residing in KwaZulu 137• Szeftel concurs that through the 
dispensing of patronage, ethnicity became more salient as those who were not Zulu were 
. d fi 138 restncte rom access to resources . Thus ethnicity became the means by which to 
determine how important resources would be distributed in KwaZulu. Buthelezi's access to 
patronage put him in the position to be able to render ethnicity salient in the everyday lives of 
h ·d·· K aZ I 139 t ose reSl mg m w u u . 
Szeftel's argument is problematic for the following reason. He argues that ethnicity and 
patronage are inextricably linked and that patron-client relationships are often imbued with 
ethnic symbols, so as to grant them legitimacy 140. According to Szeftel, Buthelezi's rise to 
power rested heavily upon his use of patronage and on that of engaging in ethnic 
mobilization 141. His argument pertaining to the salience of patronage is deterministic in the 
sense that he asserts that Buthelezi's supporters were driven solely by their material needs. 
135 Ibid 
136 Ibid 
137 Ibid 
138 Ibid 
139 Ibid 
140 Szeftel 1994, 196 
141 Ibid 
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He appears to contradict this claim when he asserts that patron-client relations need to be 
awarded legitimacy from another source, suggesting that simple resource exchange is not 
afforded legitimacy and that ethnic symbols need to be used to legitimize exchanges which 
are made. His argument suggests that Buthelezi's supporters were only offering their loyalty 
to him for material reward and that in order to make this situation appear 'decent', ethnic 
sentiments were drawn upon. It reads as economically deterministic. The mere fact that 
people were of the view that patron-client relations ought to be legitimized in some other 
way, suggests that Buthelezi's supporters were not limited to thinking only about material 
reward and believed that a quest purely directed toward personal enrichment was illegitimate. 
Weber and his contemporaries 
Central to the argument presented in this thesis is the manner in which 'charisma' is 
conceptualized. With respect to this, Weber's typology of authority will be presented in full, 
so as to be able to clearly distinguish between the three types of legitimate authority that he 
spoke of. In addition to this, his assertions about charismatic leadership which are presented 
in the text entitled, 'Economy and Society (Volume 1)' will be provided. In response to his 
claims about charismatic leadership, will follow an examination of the ways in which more 
contemporary writers have interpreted his work on this specific type of authority. 
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Weber's Typology of Authority 
Weber argued that there are three pure types of authority and that claims to this legitimate 
authority may be based on rational grounds, traditional grounds or on charismatic grounds l42 . 
I. Legal Authority: Normative rules exist and they are believed to be legal. Commands by 
people who have been placed in positions of authority through the observing of these rules 
are accepted, as a result of the acceptance of the legality of these rules l43 . 
2. Traditional Authority: Authority figures have had their positions legitimized by 
tradition. A belief in the sanctity of established tradition exists and figures of authority attain 
these positions through the observation of tradition 144. 
3. Charismatic Authority: Charismatic leaders are heroic in character or they possess some 
other type of exemplary characteristic l45 . Followers are devoted to this unique individual and 
the normative rules which are promulgated by this person are accepted on these grounds. 
Weber's description of charismatic leadership as presented in the book entitled, 'Economy 
and Society' (1968) reads as follows; 
142 Weber 1947, 300, 301 
143 Ibid, 300 
144 Ibid, 301 
145 Ibid 
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'a certain quality of an individual personality by virtue of which he is considered extraordinary and treated as 
endowed with supernatural, superhuman, or at least specifically exceptional powers or qualities. These are 
such as are not accessible to the ordinary person, but are regarded as of divine origin or as exemplary, and on 
the basis of them the individual concerned is treated as a leaderu6 ,. 
Interpretations of Weber's assertions on charismatic authority 
According to Bendix in his book entitled, 'Max Weber: An intellectual portrait' (1960), 
Weber conceives of charismatic leadership in the following manner: The charismatic leader 
practices personal rule as opposed to impersonal rule, which characterises the legal-rational 
order147• These leaders emerge in times of crisis by virtue of peoples' belief in their 
extraordinary physical or mental abilities148. They may be individuals who are believed to be 
virtuous such as prophets or doctors, conversely; they may be part of the criminal world 149• 
The charismatic leader is described as a radical, who challenges the status quo and who 
addresses the problems at hand in a forthright manner150• Followers of charismatic leaders no 
longer obey established rules as they become fully committed to their leader151 • He/she 
retains legitimacy for as long as their followers believe in the mission presented to them by 
the charismatic leader152• Charismatic leadership is described as being inherently unstable as 
146 Weber 1968, 241 
147 Bendix 1960, 300 
148 Ibid, 299 
149 Ibid 
150 Ibid, 300 
151 Ibid 
152 Ibid, 301 
37 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
it arises in times of crisis, when the crisis ends often times so too will the charismatic 
I d h· 153 ea ers Ip . 
Peter Lassman ( 'The rule of man over man' - 2000) is in agreement with Bendix and believes 
that charismatic leaders whether warlords or prophets, due to their possession of the 'gift of 
grace', are able to obtain absolute trust and devotion from their followers l54. As with Bendix, 
Lassman notes that a charismatic leader remains as such so long as he/she is able to maintain 
the support of their followers l55 . 
Frank Parkin's view ('Max Weher'-1982) of the charismatic leader as categorized by Weber, 
differs somewhat to that of Bendix and Lassman's, He does not emphasize the belief that 
charismatic leaders may be characterized as non-virtuous individuals. Rather, the manner in 
which he writes suggests that he views charismatic leaders as virtuous individuals, who ha\'e 
become powerful through their possession of extraordinary giftsl56. He speaks of the need 
for the charismatic leader to continually perform 'miracles and heroic deeds', so that their 
divine mission may be legitimized in the eyes of hislher followers 157. Parkin also emphasizes 
the belief that according to Weber, Charismatic leadership results in the most pure type of 
legitimacyl58. He claims that the charismatic leader relies solely upon the voluntary support 
153 Ibid 
154 Lassman 2000,91 
155 Ibid, 95 
156 Parkin 1982, 84 
157 Ibid 
158 Ibid 
38 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
of hislher followers and the case is such that if they choose to no longer support him/her, no 
negative consequences abound with respect to retribution from the leader l59. 
Willner in her book, 'The Spellbinders: Charismatic Political Leadership' (1984), conceives 
of Weber's understanding of a charismatic leader in the following way. He/she is perceived 
by their followers to have some type of superhuman characteristics, the followers offer 
unconditional trust and loyalty to the leader and in addition, their emotional commitment is 
unqualified I 60. She claims that many readings of Weber are erroneous in the sense that they 
attempt to incorporate unorganized elements which pertain to charisma that Weber wrote of 
in his numerous texts, into the actual definition of charismatic leadership itselfl61. She argues 
that this is problematic because these unorganized discussions around charisma in some of 
Weber's work, illustrate certain factors which may relate to the concept of charismatic 
leadership however, they do not define the term l62. The key argument she offers is that 
information about charismatic leadership should remain separate from the actual definition of 
it, so as to avoid overloading the concept and in this way rendering it useless l63. Willner 
claims that Weber, based on her reading of him, would readily acknowledge the historically 
contingent nature of his claims as they relate to charismatic leadership l64. From this she 
concurs that it ought not to be the case that certain of his statements which pertain to 
159 Ibid, 85 
160 Willner 1984, 8 
161 Ibid, 9 
162 Ibid, 10 
163 Ibid 
164 Ibid 
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charismatic leadership, be locked into the actual definition with a complete disregard for 
history 165. She would be in agreement with Bendix in terms of the view that charismatic 
leaders mayor may not be virtuous individuals166. The view of Parkin's and of those who 
share it she discounts and claims that they have not recognized the key elements of Weber's 
definition of a charismatic leader and have instead focused on issues that he raised, because 
they were relevant during his particular historical period l67. 
The relevance of Weber in the text and concluding remarks 
When engaging in discussions pertaining to charismatic leadership, it is imperative to tum to 
the work of the individual who deciphered the concept. Many different readings of Weber's 
work on charismatic leadership exist however, despite the differences commonalities do 
present. The similarities identified in these readings of Weber, provide the platform upon 
which to test whether or not it is plausible to categorize Mangosuthu Buthelezi as a 
charismatic leader. It is suspected that when reading the title of the fourth chapter, 
'Mangosuthu Buthelezi, the charismatic leader', criticism would immediately abound with 
regards to him being classified even as a partially charismatic leader. Certainly those who 
share the view of Frank Parkin and who believe that charismatic leaders are miracle 
performing prophets, would view this classification of him as problematic, given the often 
times 'un-virtuous' incidents referred to when discussing his political career. 
165 Ibid 
166 Ibid, 12 
167 Ibid, 10 
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This text has been written in accordance with the argument posited by Ann Ruth Willner, 
which suggests that to restrict the use of the title of charismatic leader to those who are 
perceived to be virtuous, is to confuse the consequences of charismatic leadership with the 
actual phenomenon itself168. That is, charismatic leadership exists independently of the 
positive or negative consequences which it may result in169. With this in mind and working 
with the similarities identified in the different readings of Weber's conceptualization of 
charismatic leadership (which will be discussed in detail in the conceptual chapter), the 
question as to how Buthelezi ascended to power is addressed. 
Chapter Two: Conceptual Chapter 
Charisma 
A few of the many readings of Weber's conception of charisma and of charismatic leadership 
which exist have been discussed in the Literature Review. It is the reading of Weber's work 
which is advocated by Anne Ruth Willner that will be utilized in the following examination 
of Mangosuthu Buthelezi's leadership style. As mentioned in the review, Willner is of the 
opinion that much of the literature on Weber's conception of charisma is problematic in that 
unrelated pieces of text from his multiple works that relate in some form to charisma have 
been forced into the actual definition of charismatic leadership itself170. She argues that just 
because certain factors may relate to a particular term, this does not automatically mean that 
168 Ibid, 12 
169 Ibid 
170 Willner 1984, 9 
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all of these factors define the concept17l. Willner's key assertion is that the definition of 
charismatic leadership should not be overloaded by information which simply relates to the 
concept, as this will result in it becoming redundant 172. She argues furthermore that 
according to her reading of him, Weber would acknowledge the historically contingent nature 
of his assertions about charismatic leadership 173. As such, it is her argument that the 
statements which Weber made which relate to charisma ought not to be forcefully locked into 
the definition of charismatic leadership, without any attention given to the historically 
. fh' I' 174 contmgent nature 0 IS C aims . 
With the before mentioned factors in mind, the following constitutes the definition of 
charismatic leadership which will be utilized in this text. A charismatic leader is an 
individual who through their possession of a superhuman quality wins the loyalty and trust of 
individuals and as a result of this, these followers experience a sense of the loss of their own 
personal will 175 • From this definition two criteria emerge which may be used to assess 
individuals in terms of their leadership style. Charismatic leaders would be those who elicit 
emotional intensity from their followers and who in addition, make the personal will of their 
followers synonymous with their own. 
171 Ibid, 10 
172 Ibid 
173 Ibid 
174 Ibid 
175 Ibid, 28-29 
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The indicator entitled 'emotional intensity' speaks to the depth of feeling emanating from a 
group of followers with respect to their leader176. Charismatic individuals are believed to 
elicit emotions from followers which are powerful 177. The existence of loyalty and of 
obedience on the part of the followers may also be used to assess the depth of feeling which a 
group of people experience towards a particular leader178• 
With respect to 'the loss of personal will', this refers to the situation in which the individual 
will of each follower is subsumed into that of the charismatic leader179, That is, the will of 
the charismatic leader becomes the will of the followers. The authority of the charismatic is 
accepted because he/she is believed to possess extra-ordinary qualities180• The occurrence of 
a 'loss of personal will' on the part of followers may be made more tangible by the following 
illustration. If the followers believe that something is right simply because the charismatic 
figure has said that it is, this would count as proof towards proclaiming the existence of a 
charismatic relationship in that followers no longer differentiate between right and wrong of 
their own accord but rather, this task is left to the charismatic leader181 . Furthermore, if 
evidence emerges which suggests that assertions made by the charismatic figure are in fact 
incorrect and the situation is such that despite this, the followers remain convinced that their 
leader or representative is still correct; this serves to really solidify a particular individual's 
176 Ibid, 27 
177 Popper 2000, 730 
178 Willner 1984,28-29 
179 Lindholm 1990,34 
180 Ibid 
181 Willner 1984,25 
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categorization as that of charismatic figure l82. In addition to this, yet another indicator of the 
loss of personal will would be that of individuals undergoing extreme hardship so as to 
remain obedient to their leader l83 . Regarding this, the will to protect oneself is replaced by 
the dedication to the will of the charismatic leaderl84 . 
Whilst there is much confusion around what the definition of charismatic leadership ought to 
look like in its entirety, there appears to be a general agreement around some of the factors 
which ought to be included in the definition. In the texts discussed in the literature review the 
authors all share the belief that charismatic leaders are characterized by the emotional 
intensity levied toward them from their followers, as is illustrated by the loyalty afforded to 
them and in addition, by the manner in which their followers trust them so completely and by 
so doing, they lose their own sense of personal will. Whilst disagreement abounds in certain 
areas there is agreement between these authors around the inclusion of the criteria of 
emotional intensity and the loss of individual will, which will be used in this text, to ascertain 
the plausibility of categorizing an individual as a charismatic leader. In addition, the criteria 
which will be used to assess Buthelezi are in no way historically static and may be used in 
different circumstances and in varying historical contexts. 
182 Ibid 
183 Ibid, 27 
184 Ibid 
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Ethnicity 
In terms of the conceptualization of ethnicity in the social sciences, there exists no literary 
consensus, Rather, two opposing conceptions of the term present and authors generally 
appear to adopt one over the other. Dubouw differentiates between ethnicity as conceived of 
as 'naming' and as that of 'claiming' 185. 'Naming', refers to ethnicity being used in the 
primordial and static sense l86 , 'Claiming' conceives of ethnicity as a part of a social identity 
which is made meaningful via the process of conscious assertion, as well as through the 
process of imagining187, With respect to this latter conception of ethnicity, what exactly does 
the process of the conscious assertion of ethnicity and its imagining entail? 
A heightened awareness of ethnicity comes about via group membership 1 88, People join 
b h b ' , 1 ' 189 groups ecause uman emgs are socIa m nature , In addition to this, people come 
together in a group for disparate reasons which may include; shared biological characteristics, 
common experiences of inequality within society, or for reasons which are related to the 
spiritual, psychological or social realms l9o . Group membership results in the development of 
an imagined community 191. Regarding this, their common experience unites them despite the 
fact that they may be strangers to one another and thus a sense of community membership is 
185 Cherry 1994, 630 
186 Ibid 
187 Ibid 
188 Mare 1993, 7 
189 Ibid 
190 Mare 1993, 10 
191 Ibid, 7 
45 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
cultivated l92 , Members of groups which are formed around ethnicity share certain 
characteristics with one another, these characteristics include; cultural similarity; a belief in a 
shared historical origin and the belief that they possess an ethnic identity which is clearly 
different to that of other groups 193, 
Cultural similarity is illustrated by the fact that in large groups it is not possible to know all 
the members of the particular group personally however, the sense of belonging and affinity 
presents nevertheless194, Certain symbols come to be representative of a specific group of 
people, clearly showing them that they belong togetherl95. Examples of these kinds of 
symbols may be dress, rituals, language, festivals etc 196, 
Regarding the second characteristic of an ethnic group namely that of a shared history, the 
following may be said. The ethnic group obtains unity and legitimacy from their sense of a 
shared history and origin 197, The past in fact informs the present identity and ideology of the 
group198, Not only does the past provide the group with their current identity, but it also sets 
in motion an action plan of sorts l99. Past precedents have been set which inform future 
192 Ibid 
193 Ibid, 11 
194 Ibid 
195 Mare 1993, 12 
196 Ibid 
197 Ibid, 14 
198 Ibid 
199 Ibid, 16 
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activities and in this way, plans of action are instituted2oo. Those at the helm of enforcing 
such decisions and who are thus in positions of authority, may also have their positions 
. db h 201 sanctlOne y t e past . 
The third characteristic of an ethnic group which has been referred to is that of its unique 
status. A specific group's legitimacy rests on its uniqueness, the ways in which it is different 
from other groups, be it with respect to language, culture or religion for example202• It is 
usually the case that groups created on the basis of ethnicity thrive on comparison i.e.: on 
h 'fi' . h 203 attempts to prove t at one specl lC group IS more supenor to anot er . 
To clarify, ethnicity in the context of this text is understood to be part of an individual's 
social identity. It may become more salient if an individual were to join a group which 
enjoyed a sense of community emanating from their belief in a shared ethnic experience. 
This group would be characterized by individuals experiencing a cultural affinity with one 
another, sharing the same belief in their historical origin and in addition, having the common 
view that they are unique when compared to other groups. It must be noted at this point that 
the mere existence of groups which are organized around ethnicity, does not mean that ethnic 
conflict is inevitable204 . As Osaghae so aptly puts it, 'it is unusual to find people tearing 
200 Ibid, 17 
201 Ibid 
202 Mare 1993, 20 
203 Ibid, 21 
204 Osaghae 1994, 3 
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themselves apart simply on account of coming from different ethnic groups,205. With that 
said, I tum to the issue of what is meant when using the phrase 'ethnic mobilization'. 
Ethnic mobilization 
Osaghae argues that ethnic conflicts have been and indeed continue to be the 'Achilles heel' 
of the post-colonial African state206. However, as previously alluded to, ethnic identities in 
and of themselves, ought not to be viewed as definite precursors to conflict. This begs the 
question, why do some ethnic groups receive so much more attention than others and in 
addition, why is it the case that often these salient, ethnic groups become perpetual sources of 
consternation? A simple answer to this question is the following. If there are those who are 
able to benefit in non-ethnic ways i.e. materially or politically for example, from the 
manipulation of a specific ethnic identity, then a particular ethnic group and the issues 
surrounding it may become more salient207. If ethnicity can be used as the vehicle to attain 
power in whichever form it may be the case that it will be manipulated. 
Whilst mention has been made of the fact that ethnicity in this context, is understood to be 
socially constructed, it must be emphasized that the view that ethnic identities are merely 
created out of nothing and that they are easily 'made up' in social settings is not being 
205 Ibid 
206 Ibid, 4 
207 Mare 1993, 31 
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espoused208 • With respect to this, ethnicity can only be manipulated by political 
entrepreneurs (those who use ethnicity for personal gain) if the claims which are made by 
these individuals resonate in some form with the personal and everyday lives of ordinary 
people209 . 
Patronage 
'Patronage' is the term which is used to describe relationships of dependenc/ 1o• In Africa in 
particular, these types of relationships have developed most often in conditions of inequality 
and in situations in which large groups of the population are politically disempowered2JJ. In 
these types of relationships leaders/patrons provide their followers/clients, who are often 
impoverished and characterized by powerlessness, with either material goods or with 
protection in exchange for labour or obedience212 . Neopatrimonialism as discussed by 
Bratton and Van der Walle is the concept which is used in the more contemporary situation, 
but which describes the same kind of dependent relationships which manifest slightly 
differently in that they occur in bureaucracies213 • In these instances public officials utilize 
208 Campbell, Mare and Walker 1995, 289 
209 Ibid 
210 Adam & Moodley 1992, 508 
211 Ibid 
212 Ibid 
213 Bratton and Van der Walle 1994, 458 
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their official position to extract resources, so as to enable them to provide material resources 
or other favours to their clients in exchange for their loyalty and support214. 
Chapter Three: Contextual Chapter 
Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi is an extremely complex political figure. He gained prominence 
in the early seventies and ultimately was awarded the title of Chief Minister of KwaZulu in 
1976215 . Since South Africa's first democratic election in 1994, Buthelezi, the president of 
the IFP, appears to have experienced a decline in his political power. The popular support 
given to his party steadily decreased as is evidenced by both national and provincial electoral 
results. In order to address the question as to why Buthelezi at one point possessed much 
political power and then to further explain a few of the possible reasons behind his waning 
power in the democratic context thus far, a historical overview is essential. 
Firstly, much of Buthelezi's power in the pre-democratic context was based on the effective 
mobilization of the Zulu people. His appeals to Zulu history played a pivotal role in his 
attempts to establish a rapport between himself and this constituencl l6. Buthelezi focused 
extensively on the Shakan era, the era of Zulu nation-building, when making appeals to 
history217. The purpose of this first section of the historical overview is to provide a reading 
214 Ibid 
215 Government Communication and Information System (GCIS) 2002 (Profile information: Mangosuthu 
Buthelezi, Dr) 
216 Golan 1994, 7 
217 Ibid 
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of history, which makes claims about Zulu historiography which are contrary to those 
expressed by Buthelezi. The reason behind this is to illustrate the view that Buthelezi chose 
to make use of a particular reading of history, a reading which assisted him in the 
mobilization of a constituency. The contents of this first section of the historical overview 
will shed light on the chapter to follow, which discusses amongst other issues Buthelezi's use 
of history in his crafting of a charismatic persona. The second section of this chapter provides 
more contemporary contextual information, which assists in establishing the environment in 
which Inkatha (now the IFP) emerged and it partly describes the manner in which it 
functioned. This background information is essential with respect to the contents of the 
chapters to follow. 
Zulu society in the pre-Shakan era 
Historian James Gump presents a reading of Zulu history which is contrary to that which is 
espoused by Buthelezi. He refers to the existence of linguistic and archaeological findings 
which support the claim that pre-Shakan Zululand was populated by a multiplicity of ethnic 
groupings and that peaceful interaction between these groups of people did occur218. In 
addition to this, Gump reveals that the evidence found suggests that the Zulu language and 
culture was an amalgam of the languages and cultures of the other ethnic groupings which 
were to be found in Zululand219 • 
218 Gump 1990, 27 
219 Ibid, 36 
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The reading of Zulu history promulgated by Buthelezi did not foreground this pre-Shakan 
period22o . Rather, his reading emphasized the homogeneity of the Zulu ethnic group and its 
cultural distinctiveness especially with respect to the warrior status which Zulu men 
possessed221 • In addition to this, Buthelezi spoke of only the Zulu people as historically 
occupying the area which constitutes K waZulu; this assisted him in rendering his acceptance 
of the position of Prime Minister of KwaZulu in 1976 legitimate222 . In order to reveal the 
manner in which Buthelezi set about recounting a reading of Zulu history which would be 
beneficial to him and to illustrate his choice to leave certain elements out of his historical 
accounts, the work of James Gump, who expresses a different understanding of Zulu history, 
is examined. No attempt is being made here to locate a 'true history'. Rather, an alternate 
reading of history is provided so as to be able to compare it with Buthelezi' s accounts, in this 
way revealing how he utilized history to his advantage. 
According to Gump, European castaways and the collections by Bryant and John Henderson 
Soga provide descriptions of this area and of the people who resided there223 • From this 
information it appears that Zululand was home to the Xhosa, Tsonga, Khoisan, Nguni and 
Sotho people224 • Gump argues that whilst it was the case that many different groupings of 
people presented in the Zululand region, it would seem that a fair amount of interaction 
220 Campbell, Mare and Walker 1995, 293 
221 I bid 
222 Mare 1992, 64 
223 Gump 1990, 28 
224 Ibid, 34 
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occurred between them225 . With respect to this he cites the following example; the 
Portuguese survivors of the 'Nossa Senhora de Belem' shipwreck noted that they encountered 
people who both herded cattle and who cultivated millet226. Cattle herding had commonly 
been associated with 'Bantu' practice and millet cultivation with Khoikhoi practice, the latter 
is but one example which he used to illustrate the interaction between the groups227. Despite 
the references made to group interaction, Gump points to the existence of three distinct clans 
in Zululand which had emerged by the seventeenth century. These were the 'Lala' clan 
(Tsonga-Nguni combination), the 'Mbo-Dhlamini' (Sotho-Tsonga-Nguni amalgam) and the 
'Ntungwa' (Nguni people)228. 
According to Gump the Nguni linguistic group, who formed the 'Ntungwa' clan, had come 
about as a result of their intermingling with the other groupings, who had occupied the 
Zululand region some time prior to their arrival229. According to this, their language was 
based on an amalgam of other languages which possessed a lengthier history230, The 
'Ntungwa' included the Zulu, Khumalo and the Quabe231 , Of these sub-groupings it was the 
Quabe who appeared most powerful232 . By the eighteenth century the Quabe had forced 
groups related to the 'Lala' clan southwards and they had extended their chiefdom 
225 Ibid, 35 
226 Ibid 
227 Ibid 
228 Ibid, 36 
229 Ibid 
230 Ibid 
231 Ibid, 38 
232 Ibid 
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substantially233. By the time of Shaka the Quabe constituted one of the largest chiefdoms in 
Zululand234. 
The Shakan era and the end of the Zulu Royal House 
Buthelezi often referred to the Shakan era at public gatherings235 . In particular he 
emphasized the unified status of the Zulu people after Shaka's reign236. De Villiers Minaar 
presents a historical account which differs substantially to Buthelezi' s reading of history. He 
argues that in the period just after Shaka's rule the Zulu people were deeply divided237, 
Multiple cleavages presented which related to spirituality and the legitimacy of certain 
traditional leaders238 • Once again in order to demonstrate the manner in which Buthelezi 
chose to utilize a specific reading of history which was beneficial to him, it is necessary to 
examine an alternate account which illustrates the many historical events which Buthelezi 
chose to omit in his reading of Zulu history. 
De Villiers Minnaar states that Shaka, who ruled the Zulu Kingdom from the period of 1816 
to 1828, increased his power base by conquering the tribes surrounding his own and by 
233 Ibid 
234 Ibid 
235 Campbell, Mare and Walker 1995, 293 
236 Szeftel 1994, 194 
237 De Villiers Minnaar 1991, 4 
238 Ibid, 4 & 187 
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incorporating those individuals who were of use to him into his own Zulu tribe239. These 
attacks resulted in social dislocation with people fleeing from the Zulu impis to Natal in 
particular24o. Collectively this wide-spread violence and the abundance of refugees which 
presented during the time ofShaka became known as the 'Mfecane Wars,241. By the year of 
1821 Shaka controlled the area from the Phongolo River in the north to the Tongati River in 
the southern region, as well as from the eastern seaboard to the Drakensberg Mountains in the 
west242. Whilst tribal chiefs who were not Zulu were permitted by Shaka to govern their 
people, they were expected to answer to him alone and absolute loyalty to him was 
demanded243 . In September of 1828 Shaka was assassinated by his personal servant and his 
two half-brothers, Dingane and Mhlangana244. 
De Villiers Minnaar claims that Dingane's rise to power did not usher in a period of peace as 
was hoped for; instead his rule was described to be as ruthless as Shaka's was245. Dingane 
turned against his own people as a result of his belief that some of them were being disloyal 
to him and were insulting him in private246. He punished them violently for this supposed 
disloyalty and many fled Zululand in fear of him247. This event began the historical process 
239 Ibid, 3 
240 Ibid 
241 Carton 2000, 20 
242 De Villiers Minnaar 1991, 4 
243 Ibid 
244 Carton 2000, 24 
245 De Villiers Minnaar 1991, 4 
246 Ibid 
247 Ibid 
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of the separation of Zululand from Nataf48. White traders who arrived in Port Natal 
(Durban) in 1824 were asked by the refugees from Zululand for protection from the arbitrary 
rule enacted by Dingane249. The influence that the white traders and missionaries had on the 
Zulu people was profound25o. Those who sought their protection adopted 'western' values 
and Christianity (known as the Amakholwa) whilst those who remained in Zululand accepted 
the authority of the royal house251 . With respect to this, members of both groupings were 
characterized by their antagonistic attitude towards those of the 'opposing' group252. 
On the 16th December of 1838 Dingane was defeated by the Voortrekkers at the Battle of 
Blood River253 . In order to provide himself with a scapegoat for this defeat Dingane accused 
his half brother, Mpande, of treachery and fled254 . In 1840 Mpande and the Boers found 
Dingane and forced him into the north-eastern part of Zululand, where he was killed by a 
group of African people whom he had harmed politically255. Mpande was pronounced by the 
Boers as the new leader of the Zulu people256. His reign was not as bloody as that of Shaka' s 
and Dingane' s however, he did wish to capture the chiefdoms surrounding Zululand and 
248 Ibid, 5 
249 Ibid 
250 Ibid 
251 Ibid 
252 Golan 1994, 56 
253 Carton 2000, 26 
254 De Villiers Minnaar 1991, 5 
255 Carton 2000, 27 
256 Ibid 
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engaged in raids to this effect, particularly in the areas which lay to the North of Zululand257, 
Mpande failed to make known who his successor would be and as such the years between 
1856 and 1861 were fraught with violent unrest258, Ultimately Cetshwayo, one of Mpande's 
older sons made it known that he was the rightful heir259, He assumed power only to be 
defeated by the British in the Anglo-Zulu War, which took place in 187926°, Upon this defeat 
Cetshwayo was exiled and Zululand was divided into thirteen sub-territories which were 
placed under the leadership of British appointed 'traditional' chiefs26 1 , The three chiefs who 
held the most power in Zululand were John Dunn, Zibhebhu and Hamu262, These three chiefs 
in particular created much animosity when they blatantly exploited the dispensation granted 
to them by the British Government which gave them permission to take cattle and firearms 
from the Royal house and from those who were attached to it263 , Those who supported the 
Royal House and who were against these appointed chiefs were known as the Usuthu Faction 
and they ardently supported Cetshwayo' s return from exile264 , 
In 1880 violence between the Usuthu, Zibhebhu and Hamu factions broke out and northern 
Zulu land found itself in a state of civil war265, In the period between 1881 and 1882 a 
257 De Villiers Minnaar 1991, 5 
258 Ibid 7 
259 Ibid 
260 Carton 2000, 39 
261 Carton 2000,40 & 41 
262 Ibid 
263 De Villiers Minnaar 1991, 7 
264 Ibid 
265 Golan 1994, 57 
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summer drought occurred which it is argued appeared to exacerbate an already explosive 
situation and in light of this, the British agreed to facilitate Cetshwayos return266. Although 
his return was permitted it was not without certain conditionalities. He was to return as chief 
of the Usuthu people and was no longer permitted to retain the title of King of the Zulus2tl7. 
His new found status was short lived as on the 29th of March of 1883 Cetshwayo was killed 
by Zibhebhu in what became known as the Battle of Msebe268 . 
In response to this battle, Dinuzulu, Cetshwayo's heir, requested the assistance of the Boers 
to defeat Zibhebhu269. The Battle of Tshaneni which occurred on the 4th June of 1884 saw 
the latter come to fruition however; the assistance given to Dinuzulu had strings attached270. 
Dinuzulu had to cede almost the entire western half of Zululand to the Boers in exchange for 
their assistance271 . This occupation of such a vast expanse of land by the Boers did not go 
unnoticed by the British and on the 14th of May they formally annexed the eastern half of 
Zululand272 , Late in the year of 1887 the British informed Dinuzulu and his chiefs that 
Zibhebhu was to be given permission to operate in the territory previously occupied by 
him273. In response to this, Dinuzulu and his supporters fought against Zibhebhu and the 
266 De Villiers Minnaar 1991, 8 
267 Ibid 
268 Ibid 
269 Ibid 
270 Ibid 
271 Ibid, 9 
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British forces274. They were not successful and Dinuzulu was sent into exile275. This event 
was to mark the end of the authority of the Zulu Royal House276, Ten years later in 1897, 
Zululand as it had been known was no longer and it became formally incorporated into Natal 
by the British277. From the above it appears that Buthelezi chose to ignore the divided nature 
of Zulu society both in the Shakan era and in the period following his death in favour of a 
historical account which spoke of the Zulu people as a unified nation ofwarriors278. 
A more contemporary history: Structural constraints develop 
The late half of the 1920's was characterized by an aggressive militancy on the part of the 
Zulu people279. A shortage of land emerged both in Natal and Zululand as a result of the 
inception of the Shepstonian system of segregation and the annexation of territory in 
Zululand by both the British and the Boers280, Land shortages continued to be a structural 
constraint during the period in which Buthelezi became Prime Minister of KwaZulu281 . This 
constraint was utilized by him as a means to gamer support and this will be discussed in the 
chapters on ethnicity and patronage in more detail. A brief historical account of this 
274 Ibid 
275 Ibid 
276 Ibid 
277 Golan 1994, 57 
278 Szeftel 1994, 194 
279 Marks & Trapido 1987, 46 
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structural constraint is provided in light of the fact that it continued to be of relevance during 
Buthelezi's rise to power and as mentioned, constituted part of the means by which Buthelezi 
emerged as a key leader in the politics of Apartheid South Africa. 
When the Boers conceded defeat to the British in 1843 and Natal became the sole property of 
Britain, the task of addressing the large number of black people in Natal came to the fore282 . 
Many Zulu people had fled to Natal during the reign of Dingane which was previously 
discussed283 • Theophilus Shepstone instituted a system of segregation in Natal in 1845, 
wherein the approximately 100 000 black people residing in Natal were to be accommodated 
in designated reserves284 • The ground enclosed in these reserves was largely infertile and 
agricultural activity, the mainstay of those residing in the reserves became extremely 
challenging285 • What is generally termed as 'faction fighting', which refers to violence 
characterized by kindred loyalties and which is often associated with the pursuit for land 
became commonplace286• Land scarcity was not only of concern to the Zulu people in Natal, 
those residing in Zululand were encountering a similar land shortage as the British and Boers 
had annexed much of the region287 • 
282 Ibid 
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State support of Zulu Nationalism 
State support of Zulu Nationalism which partly facilitated Buthelezi's ascent to power was 
not limited to South Africa's Apartheid era. Indeed in the later half of the 1920's the 
militancy of the Zulu people appeared to abate as a large portion of the Natal intelligentsia 
turned their attention to the development of a 'modernized' Zulu Monarchy288, The state 
supported this endeavour as it suited their interests289. Not only did the venture gain the 
support of the state but in addition, sugar barons and those with mining interests sought the 
successful development of a modern Zulu monarchy29o. The latter would be able to appeal to 
the vast Zulu majority in a way that could potentially cut across cleavages which were 
evident in the society and would be able to gamer 'unified' support29 I , If these groups 
became allies of the Zulu monarchy, the view was that they may be able to have influence 
over the Zulu population as a whole. As a means to promote the development of a modem 
Zulu monarchy, Chief Albert Luthuli established the Zulu Society292. His goal was to have 
the status of the Zulu king formally recognized293 . The Native Affairs Department financed 
the Zulu Society until 1946 however, by 1948 the organization ceased to exist294 . The lack of 
288 Marks & Trapido 1987,46 
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militancy during the 1930's and a large portion of the 1940's may be explained by the 
attention afforded by government to Zulu nationalism295 • 
In contrast to this, the events unfolding in Alexandra Township, located on the outskirts of 
Johannesburg, were markedly different to those occurring in Natal. Members of the ANC, 
which was formed in 1912 and those from the Communist Party of South Africa (CPSA), 
which came into being in 1921, began large scale protest action in the 1940's against racial 
discrimination296• In 1940 bus boycotts occurred in the area outside of Johannesburg and in 
1943 and 1944 sixty illegal strikes took place297 . In addition to this, 1946 saw sixty five 
thousand mineworkers engaging in striking action298 • 1944 Marked the year of the AI\ C 
Youth League's inception and in 1949, one year after the National Party's (NP) accent to 
power, the movement adopted the Youth League's Programme of Action299• The latter called 
for the implementation of mass protest campaigns so as to speedily facilitate black 
liberation30o. 
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A political vacuum emerges 
The historical infonnation which will follow illustrates the manner in which a political space 
emerged for Inkatha's inception particularly in the later half of the 1960's and early 
seventies. 1950 Saw the enacting of the 'Suppression of Communism' Act30I . This was 
passed by the NP government so as to decimate the growing influence that members of the 
CPSA possessed302 . The organization was forced underground and became known as the 
South African Communist Party (SACP)303. Some of its members found representation in the 
ANC, South African Indian Congress and later in the South African Congress of Trade 
Unions (SACTU)304. The latter organization was founded in 1955 and eventually joined 
forces with the previously mentioned organizations as well as with the Coloured People's 
Congress to fonn what became known as the Congress Alliance305. 
In this same year the Freedom Charter was drafted and some months later adopted by the 
ANC306. After non-violent stayaways and striking activities occurred in the late 1950's and 
in 1960, 1961 saw the birth of Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK)307. The latter constituted the 
military wing of the ANC and its inception marked the move away from a focus on passive 
301 Norva11993, 50 
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resistance toward the adoption of armed struggle308. MK was severely weakened in 1963 
when the South African Security Police infiltrated MK structures at the Lilliesleaf farm3il9• 
Key players such as Nelson Mandela were prosecuted at the Rivonia trials and the document 
detailing MK's strategic plans for overthrowing the Apartheid regime entitled, 'Operation 
Mayibuye', was confiscated31O, Conditions in MK camps during the early part of the 1970's 
were squalid and this together with the before mentioned, weakened the morale of the 
members of MK311. The ANC alliance diminished in stature as well upon the establishment 
of organizations espousing the ideals of Black Consciousness (BC)312. These BC 
organizations however enjoyed a short life span as the NP government issued a ban against 
them 313 . Morale was generally low in that those who were tasked with being the forerunners 
of the quest to gain black liberation had seemed to fail. It was at this point that Mangosuthu 
Buthelezi established lnkatha. 
The rebirth of Inkatha (1975) 
The first lnkatha was founded by King Solomon in 1923 together with members of the 
educated Zulu elite such as John Dube, who was the editor of the black newspaper entitled, 
Ilanga Lase Nata1314. It was an organization established to promote Zulu Nationalism as a 
308 Ibid 
309 Jeffery 1997, 19 
310 Norval1993, 27 & 29 
3ll Jeffery 1997, 20 
312 Norval1993, 30 
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result of the fear of cultural domination by the British and at a later stage by the 
Afrikaaners315 , Many years later a second Inkatha was born, On the 21 sl March of 1975 at 
KwaNzimela, an area in Northern KwaZulu, the Inkatha National Cultural Liberation 
Movement was born316 , According to the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), the former Inkatha 
movement, the majority of those who played a role in the establishment of Inkatha were 
former ANC officials or political activists, who on the banning of their organization together 
with that of the Pan African Congress (PAC), decided to respond by creating a new 
, , 317 
orgamzatlOn , 
Prior to the establishment of Inkatha in 1975, its president had already developed an 
extremely public persona318 , Buthelezi travelled extensively both domestically and abroad319, 
He met with members of both the ANC and the PAC who were in exile and with African 
heads of state320, When travelling, Buthelezi publicly denounced Apartheid, He spoke of the 
need to be realistic when attempting to topple the regime321 , Jeffery argues that according to 
Buthelezi, Apartheid could only be destroyed through strategic planning and the development 
of organized constituencies, she claims that he did not believe that armed struggle was the 
way to set about liberating the country322, In Jeffery's account she argues that Buthelezi saw 
315 Golan 1994, 67 & 68 
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liberation materializing in the following way; Firstly, Homeland leaders were not to accept 
independence as this would be tantamount to them assisting in the removal of African 
participation in South Africa's politics323. Buthelezi argued that the reason behind his 
acceptance of the role of Chief Minister of KwaZulu in 1976 was that of the need to prevent 
independence being forced upon the Zulu people324 • 
Secondly, he believed that the development of a broad based political organization was 
essential in order to destroy the Apartheid regime325 • He suggested that the ANC and PAC 
had been destroyed as a result of the detention of certain of their leaders and that in order to 
avoid this same fate, the development of an organization that had made inroads and rooted 
itself firmly within black communities was essentiae26• This organization would not be able 
to be ignored by government and would be able to exert pressure upon them327• It was out of 
this belief that lnkatha came to be. Membership to Inkatha was initially limited to Zulu 
people so as to ensure that in its fledgling state the organization would not be banned by 
government328. However, two years after its inception, the organization opened its doors to 
323 Ibid 
324 Norva11993, 77 
325 Jeffery 1997, 23 
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all Africans329. According to Jeffery, Inkatha's membership grew substantially and by 1979, 
she suggests that Inkatha was the largest black movement in South Africa330. 
The third facet of Buthelezi' s strategy to topple the regime was that of avoiding violence at 
all costs33l . Buthelezi pointed to the military might of the regime and argued that liberation 
would not be found in this way332. He advocated that negotiations be entered into to bring 
about liberation in South Africa333. To this end, Buthelezi emphasized the need to have a 
convention in which black liberation leaders would be able to come together to formulate 
alternatives to Apartheid334. His view was that it was of no use to fight the liberation cause 
without some idea as to what Apartheid could be replaced with once liberation had been 
attained. Buthelezi was a driving force behind the establishment of the South African Black 
Alliance (SABA) of which Inkatha, the Reform Party (Indian Community), the Labour Party 
(Coloured representation) and political parties from the Homelands of KaNgwane and 
QwaQwa were a part335 . The SABA was established so as to promote black unity and in this 
way facilitate discussions around alternatives to Apartheid336. He also set up the Buthelezi 
Commission together with input from the Progressive Federal Party, formerly known as the 
329 Ibid 
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Progressive Party, which was established in 1959 after a split in the United Party occurred337 , 
In this commission a new constitutional structure for a federal South Africa was formulated, 
which integrated Natal with KwaZulu. 338 
Jeffery argues that the fourth facet oflnkatha's strategy to topple the Apartheid regime was to 
gain international funding which could be channelled toward the economic development of 
black people339• Buthelezi did not support economic sanctions in South Africa as he believed 
that such policies resulted in an already dire economic situation becoming even worse340 , He 
travelled extensively overseas gaining funding for his anti-Apartheid campaign from 
countries such as Canada and the United States, which believed that the ANC was under 
communist leadership and which saw Buthelezi as being more moderate and in line with their 
ideological beliefs341 • 
Just over a year after the inception of Inkatha, events unfolded in the country which resulted 
in deep divisions developing between Inkatha and the ANC/SACP alliance342• The South 
African Student's Organization (SASO), which was established in 1969, promoted the 
ideology of black consciousness throughout the townships and in the schools343 . Black 
337 Marks & Trapido 1987, 366 
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Consciousness played an integral role in the riot which occurred on the 16th June of 1976344• 
After the shooting of a thirteen year old boy, students violently targeted all symbols of 
Apartheid345. The rioting against Apartheid was not limited to this day or to this particular 
community, two months after this event, 160 communities were violently protesting against 
Apartheid policy346. Stayaways were called by student leaders and those found to be 
contravening these orders were targeted347. Migrant labourers who did not want to lose their 
jobs and who did not partake in the stayaways were attacked and their hostels were burnt348• 
Violence between the hostel-dwellers (many of whom supported Inkatha) and those calling 
for stayaways erupted specifically in Nyanga in Cape Town and at the Mzimhlope Hostel in 
Sowet0349. 
The ANC/SACP alliance believed that the events which had unfolded after June 16th 
illustrated that armed struggle and violent protest could be sustained and that revolutionary 
action was possible350 . Buthelezi held the opposing view and saw the incidents which had 
unfolded as a miserable waste of black lives351 .In order to align the ANC/SACP alliance and 
lnkatha once again, a meeting between Buthelezi and those leaders of the ANC who were in 
344 Norval1993, 31 & 32 
345 Jeffery 1997, 27 
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London took place in 1979352• At this meeting Buthelezi refused to accede to armed action 
and to the promotion of economic sanctions on South Africa353 . Divisions manifested from 
this and from the fact that the proceedings of the meeting were made public, when all 
involved had agreed that they ought to remain confidentiae54• Much finger pointing has been 
done as to who leaked the story to the press with most fingers pointing at Buthelezi however, 
this has not been proven355 • Irrespective of this, the mere fact that the ANC believed that 
Buthelezi leaked the story and that Buthelezi was faced with animosity toward him from the 
ANC, resulted in relations between the two organizations deteriorating still further. 
The 1980's saw the relationship between Inkatha and the ANC/SACP alliance being 
characterized by endemic violence356. The introduction of Prime Minister, P.W. Botha's 
reforms in the early 1980's, which permitted the legal formation of African trade unions, 
granted municipal power to the black townships, provided Coloured and Indian people with 
separate chambers of parliament and lifted the racial restrictions on marriage, sex and public 
accommodation, appeared to be a primary catalyst in the round of anti-Apartheid activism 
which began in 1984357. The granting of municipal power to the townships resulted in an 
352 Ibid, 32 
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increase in rent prices owing to the fact that these municipal councils were short of resources 
and were attempting to increase their revenue in this manner358. 
The introduction of the separate chambers of parliament for Coloured and Indian members 
was met with fierce resistance, as during the period in which individuals were being elected 
to occupy positions in these chambers, rioting and boycotting occurred.359 In reaction to 
these occurrences, the government responded by instituting township patrols by police and 
soldiers and in addition, detentions became common as did house to house searches36o. The 
response of the state ushered in a spate of strikes, violent attacks and boycotts from members 
of the UDF, an opposition movement comprising of the banned ANC, COSATU and of many 
civic, youth, women's' and student organizations361 . In 1985 in response to the 
ungovernability of the country, the state declared a State of Emergency362. Inkatha members 
and those of the UDF clashed violently particularly in the areas of Pietermaritzburg and 
Durban363. 
In March of 1986 the State of Emergency was lifted and violence in this area increased 
dramatically364. In June of the same year a second State of Emergency was declared in the 
358 Ibid 
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country and this resulted in the curbing of violence in most areas however, bloodshed 
continued unabated in Pietermaritzburg and in Nata1365. The announcement made by F.W. de 
Klerk on the 2nd of February of 1990, which spoke of the unbanning of the ANC, of plans to 
free Nelson Mande1a as well as of the intention to negotiate a democratic constitution for the 
country, increased the levels of violence in the country366. 
In July of 1990 it was revealed that the government had been funding Inkatha's rallies as well 
as their workers union, UWUSA (United Workers Union of South Africa)367. This became 
known as the Inkathagate scandal and resulted in yet another outbreak of violence between 
members of Inkatha and those of the UDF368. These violent exchanges between the UDF and 
Inkatha continued throughout the early 1990's, the period in which negotiations between the 
ANC, IFP (Inkatha became the lnkatha Freedom Party on 14th July 1990) and the NP were 
occurring369. 
According to Sisk during this time, Buthelezi made use of the threat of violence to ensure that 
he was and continued to be, one of the key players in South Africa's negotiations toward a 
new democratic dispensation370• Within the negotiation process Buthelezi's key aims were to 
ensure that minority rights were protected in the new constitution and furthermore, to ensure 
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that the country would become a federation, which would have permitted him to continue to 
maintain his constituency in Natae71 . It was also at this stage that Buthelezi and the NP 
seriously considered forging a coalition in the future, owing to the fact that they shared 
common interests372• Both parties sought a federal constitution which protected minority 
rights, as both knew that in the period following the first democratic election, the ANC would 
. h d' 373 constItute t e ommant party . 
1994 Saw the South African state experiencing its first ever democratic election with the 
Government of National Unity comprising of the big three negotiating partners, taking the 
reins of power. Since the first democratic elections in 1994, the NP no longer exists and the 
IFP has experienced a continual decline in its levels of popular support, which is made 
manifest through its dwindling number of votes. It is at this point that attention is turned to 
the question at hand, how did Buthelezi in the pre-democratic context achieve a high degree 
of political power and why in the democratic context thus far has his power waned? 
Chapter Four: Mangosuthu Buthelezi, the charismatic leader 
The literature review suggests that the explanations of Buthelezi's ascent to power which are 
provided, do not award sufficient recognition to the central role which he personally played 
towards achieving this end. Much of the literature makes mention of the success which 
371 Ibid, 184 
372 Ibid, 185 
373 Ibid 
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Buthelezi enjoyed through the process of ethnic mobilization and as a result of his access to 
patronage. However, the question as to why Buthelezi was able to successfully mobilize 
around ethnicity and that of how he managed to legitimately gain access to patronage is not 
adequately discussed. Regarding this, Campbell, Mare and Walker draw specific attention to 
the manner in which Buthelezi's appeals to legendary Zulu warriors of old, resonated with 
the poor who lived in KwaZulu as it reminded them of a time when Zulu people lived with 
dignity, something which they did not enjoy under the Apartheid regime374 . Their 
explanation of Buthelezi's success with respect to ethnic mobilization, rests heavily on the 
characteristics of the constituency which he mobilized, as is illustrated by their referral to this 
group being 'ripe' for manipulation as a result of their poor economic situation375• This text 
argues that whilst the characteristics of the group which is to be mobilized around ethnicity 
are of utmost importance to any explanation of successful ethnic mobilization, it would 
appear that the nature of the individual engaging in the process of ethnic mobilization also 
warrants attention. 
Golan appears to work towards this end with her focus on Buthelezi and the manner in which 
she believes he set about promulgating a specific reading of history, which assisted him in 
laying the foundations for successful ethnic mobilization376 , However, she does not consider 
that which afforded Buthelezi the opportunity to have people listen to his reading of history 
in the first place. Evidence will be examined in this chapter which speaks to the plausibility 
374 Campbell, Mare and Walker 1995, 294 
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of categorizing Buthelezi as a charismatic leader, which may provide assistance in explaining 
why people listened to him in the first place. 
As has been mentioned Weber, the pioneer of the concept of charismatic authority conceived 
of it in the following way; 
'a certain quality of an individual personality by virtue of which he is considered extraordinary and treated as 
endowed with supernatural, superhuman, or at least specifically exceptional powers or qualities. These are 
such as are not accessible to the ordinary person, but are regarded as of divine origin or as exemplary, and on 
the basis of them the individual concerned is treated as a leader377 ,. 
When reading this definition of charismatic leadership, Buthelezi may not be the individual 
who immediately comes to mind as an example of one who possesses extraordinary qualities. 
However, as Willner argued in relation to understanding Weber, his definition of charisma 
and that of charismatic leadership ought to be treated as historically contingent378• Viewing 
Buthelezi as a charismatic leader may be difficult in that Weber cited individuals who were 
magicians or prophets as those who may be defined as charismatic leaders, as they possessed 
seemingly 'superhuman' gifts379. Today's world is markedly different to that of Weber's and 
as such, the manner in which charisma is expressed is also different. 
The secularization of the world has resulted in prophets and magicians being replaced by 
politicians as examples of those who may potentially be charismatic leaders. 'Superhuman 
377 Weber 1968, 241 
378 Willner 1984, 10 
379 Bendix 1960, 299 
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gifts' are no longer thought of as solely relating to the magical realm and in the contemporary 
era, they may become manifest in vastly different forms. Mention was also made of the 
belief that many of the assertions that Weber made which related to charisma and which were 
limited to a particular historical context, found their way into the actual definitions of 
charismatic leadership through the works of those who wrote on the topic after him38o, This 
has resulted in much confusion around the relevance of the concept of charismatic leadership 
in the cotemporary context, as through the process of inflating definitions with other 
assertions made by Weber at a particular time, these definitions have been rendered static and 
have been unable to transcend a particular historical setting381 • It is the intention of this text 
to avoid the latter and to take cognisance of the historically contingent nature of Weber's 
definition of charismatic leadership. The criteria to be used in the examination of Buthelezi's 
leadership style were discussed in the conceptual chapter and as such, they will now be 
applied to Buthelezi to assess the degree to which he conforms to the title of charismatic 
leader. 
Buthelezi's attempt to forge emotional ties 
Chief Buthelezi created for himself an image which people could easily come to admire and 
respect. Traditional Zulu custom holds the belief that chiefs constitute an important link 
between this world and the world which is supematurae82 • 
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Chiefs in light of this are traditionally not merely viewed as political figures, but rather they 
are understood to be symbols of the Zulu nation's state of well being383 . Zulu custom holds 
that the ancestors and particularly those who were of royal blood use the chief as a vehicle to 
exercise control over the Zulu nation384. In addition to this, the Zulu king is also believed to 
be the symbol of the unity of the Zulu people as a whole385. He is the most powerful figure 
within the Zulu nation386. Buthelezi appeared in traditional Zulu dress and publicised his 
status as chief at many public gatherings which were also attended by the King of the Zulu 
people, Goodwill Zwelithini, a nephew of his, at his side387. King Goodwill demonstrated his 
support for Buthelezi when in 1974 he announced the following, 'I give full support to my 
Government, led by Chief Buthelezi ............ .1 am just not prepared to become involved in 
politicsd88 . The fact that the King of the Zulu people and the symbol of Zulu unity supported 
Buthelezi and in addition to this, the kinship ties between the two of them assisted him in 
fostering a degree of triballegitimaci89• He was thus in the position to be able to recount a 
proud Zulu history in a public forum, which spoke of the 'God-given' gifts which women had 
been given with respect to being able to give birth to Zulu children39o. In addition, he spoke 
of Zulu sons who had warrior blood flowing through their veins391 • 
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Waetjen provides an example of Buthelezi's celebration of Zulu warrior prowess when she 
refers to a statement made by him in May of 1979, at the Anglo Zulu War centenary in 
Ulundi392. At this event Buthelezi stated the following; 'It is because of (the 1789) resistance 
that we stand tall today, because although (our people) were conquered through superior 
arms, this did not mask their bravery in facing the mightiest army in the world with virtually 
their bare hands,393. Buthelezi painted a picture of history in which the Zulu 'nation' \\-as 
superior to others. As a Zulu chief, he was to be both respected and admired. He spoke of 
the Inkatha movement and of the Zulu nation interchangeably394. Obedience and loyalty to 
the Zulu culture and to the respected warriors of old such as Shaka, could be made manifest 
through becoming a member of Inkatha395 . De Haas and Paulus Zulu provide an example of 
the manner in which Buthelezi communicated the idea that Inkatha and the Zulu nation were 
synonymous with one another. They refer to an instance in Clermont, Durban in 1986, where 
a Shaka day rally was being held396. Posters displayed at the rally read as follows, 'all proud 
Zulu's', who were part of a 'mighty nation' and who shared 'a glorious heritage', ought to 
show their leaders that they were proud of them and that they supported them397. 
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The face emblazoned on the posters was that of Chief Buthelezi and the message being 
communicated was clear, if you were a proud member of the Zulu nation sharing in its 
heritage, you would support Buthelezi's Inkatha398• 
Through his publicising of his status as chief and his emphasis on the kinship ties between 
himself and King Goodwill Zwelithini, Buthelezi worked towards gaining tribal legitimacy, 
this permitted him to paint a picture of Zulu history in which the Zulu nation was superior to 
others and as such, as a legitimate tribal leader of such a superior nation, the case was such 
that he ought to be admired and respected. Respecting Buthelezi meant being a loyal and 
obedient member of Inkatha, which was positioned as the political reflection of the entire 
Zulu nation399• 
After the latter assertions, a dispute surrounding the legitimacy of Buthelezi' s chieftainship 
must at least briefly be referred to. With reference to this, he was made acting chief of the 
Buthelezis by the Apartheid Government in 1953400. His elder brother, Mceleli, who was the 
first born child of Chief Mathole's first wife, believed that it was his right to be chief and that 
Buthelezi had the backing of the Minister of Native Affairs, with respect to the acquiring of 
this position401 . 
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399 Ibid, 26 
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The dispute between Buthelezi and Mceleli was severe and at one point Buthelezi in fact 
asked the South African government to protect him from his brother402 . The government's 
response to this was that protection would be granted if Buthelezi could show them evidence 
of his compliance with the Apartheid system403 • To this 'request', Buthelezi conceded that he 
had no intention of working against the system 404. With respect to this, mention was made in 
the contextual chapter of Buthelezi's choice to work within the Apartheid state structures405 . 
This ultimately did afford him a political platform upon which to publicise himself however, 
his choice also earned him the title of collaborator as there were those, particularly members 
of the Black Consciousness (BC) movement which emerged at a later stage, who belie'ved 
that Buthelezi's only interest was that ofself-interest406• 
He had to do much convincing with respect to proving that he was not going to work against 
the Apartheid system, in fact only after four years did the Apartheid government believe him 
to be loyal enough to register him as an official chief107. It is argued here that despite the fact 
that Buthelezi's chieftainship was contested by some, it was accepted by others through the 
convincing manner in which he publicised himself and therefore, for many he was believed to 
be a chief sanctioned by traditional Zulu custom, who was therefore fit to lead. 
402 Ibid, 70 
403 Ibid 
404 Ibid 
405 Norval1993, 77 
406 Ibid, 31 & 32 
407 Ibid, 72 
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Buthelezi and the loss of personal will 
At this point I reiterate the definition of a charismatic leader which is being used in this study. 
A charismatic leader is an individual who through their possession of a superhuman quality 
wins the loyalty and trust of individuals and as a result of this, these followers experience a 
sense of the loss of their own personal will408 . What evidence is there which speaks to the 
effect which Buthelezi's charismatic attributes had on individuals? Put differently, were his 
attempts to create a loyal following successful? 
The section to follow examines empirical evidence which speaks to the plausibility of 
categorizing Buthelezi as a charismatic leader. This evidence is primarily drawn from 
sources which relate to the so-called 'Natal violence' which occurred during the 1980's and 
early 1990's. Actions taken by Buthelezi's supporters during this particular time speak to the 
presence of intense levels of loyalty and trust, which seemingly resulted in a high degree of 
synonimity between their will and that of Chief Buthelezis'. Before proceeding with an 
examination of this evidence alternate interpretations of the causes of the Natal Violence are 
discussed. It must be noted at this point that in no way is the claim being made that 
Buthelezi's charisma was the sole reason behind the violence which occurred in Natal during 
this time. What is being argued however; is that explanations of the causes of the Natal 
violence ought to include references to Buthelezi's charismatic personality and the effect 
which it had on his following, so as to make them more comprehensive. 
408 Willner 1984, 28-29 
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The motivation behind the Natal Violence 
The causes advanced for the violence which occurred in the Natal region from the early 
1980's through to the early 1990's are plentiful. Heribert Adam and Kogila Moodley in their 
article entitled, 'Political Violence, 'Tribalism " and Inkatha' (1992), categorize these 
explanations of the causes of violence in Natal in the following manner. They distinguish 
between accounts which focus on leaders/groups and their policies and those which speak to 
predisposing social conditions409 . Explanations which emphasize leaders/groups and their 
polices might focus on the role of the Third Force for example, a group of right-wing 
individuals located in the government's security force, tasked with covertly destroying peace 
initiatives or on the role which high ranking Inkatha or ANC individuals played in fuelling 
the rivalry between the two organizations41o• Moodley and Adam negate these 'single-cause' 
explanations in favour of a 'less simplistic' discussion around the predisposing social factors 
which they argue constitute the primary reason behind the violence in the region411 • 
According to them, predisposing social factors include the following; the geographical and 
generational divide which occurred in the region and the impoverished status of those 
individuals of colour who resided there412• 
409 Adam & Moodley 1992, 485 
410 Ibid 
411 Ibid 
412 Ibid 
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Gavin Woods, who wrote whilst at the Inkatha Institute in Durban, agreed with Moodley and 
Adam with regards to the role which they believe poverty played in fuelling the violence. 
However, unlike the former authors his explanation of the violence is more simplified in that 
he suggests that only the high levels of unemployment amongst the black youth as well as 
their general state of disaffection led to the violence in the region413 . Whilst poverty and 
alienation no doubt have a role to play in the fuelling of conflicts, this explanation of the 
Natal violence in and of itself does not prove to be entirely convincing. As Matthew 
Kentridge argued, poverty and alienation were not unique to Natal and many other regions in 
South Africa could have been categorized in this way414. However, what was unique to Natal 
was the intense levels of political violence which occurred between Inkatha and the UDF415. 
If poverty was the only cause of the violence in Natal, then surely many other regions in the 
country would have shared a similar fate, as they too were impoverished. 
Richard Steyn, a former editor of the Natal Witness, is also in agreement with Adam and 
Moodley's point which relates to the role which the generational and geographical 
differences played in forementing the violence in Natal. He argues that tension between the 
older and more traditional Zulus who came from the rural areas and those of the younger and 
urbanized Zulus, was the reason behind the violence416. 
413 Kentridge 1990, 217 
414 Ibid 
415 Ibid 
416 Ibid, 218 
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He claimed that the older generation of Zulus were vehemently trying to protect their way of 
life from the youth, who they perceived as disrespectful and irreverent417• Whilst this 
generational/geographical explanation of the violence does warrant attention, it in itself is not 
a convincing explanation. I refer again to Kentridge who argues that within Inkatha it has 
been the case that members of the Youth Brigade fought together with older members of the 
organization against the UDP and as such, this explanation is not entirely convincing418 . 
Whilst Adam and Moodley's explanation of the violence in Natal is more comprehensiye 
than some of the other accounts which have been provided, in that it encapsulates the role 
which poverty played in the conflict as well as the effects of the generational and 
geographical differences, it is not entirely convincing given the criticisms which have been 
presented and which relate to poverty and the generational/geographical arguments. This 
thesis proceeds from the view that in order to have an even more comprehensive conception 
of the reasons behind the violence which occurred in the Natal region, both predisposing 
socio-economic conditions and the role which individual leaders played in the violence ought 
to be considered. This text firmly acknowledges the role which socio-economic, structural 
conditions played in forementing the violence in Natal; indeed these partial explanations 
cannot be ignored. However, this text and specifically this chapter, concerns itself with a 
focus on an individual leader, Mangosuthu Buthelezi, and on whether or not he may be 
classified as a charismatic leader. 
417 Ibid 
418 Ibid 
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As such, evidence has been sought in the literature on the violence in Natal in an attempt to 
address this question i.e.; is there evidence in the literature on the violence in Natal which 
would support Buthelezi's classification as a charismatic leader? When searching for 
evidence in support of charisma, one would expect to find it in the literature on violence as 
the emotional status of individuals becomes more exposed in conflict situations. During 
conflicts one would imagine that loyalties, your own personal will and your levels of trust 
toward an individual would be more discernable than in other situations. 
Empirical evidence in support of Buthelezi's possession of charisma 
In order to ascertain whether or not Buthelezi could have been described as a charismatic 
leader during the Apartheid era, the following sources were studied so as to attempt to obtain 
empirical indicators which point to the existence of charisma on his part. Firstly, a survey 
conducted by John D. Brewer in 1980 in Kwamashu, which put to the test the degree to 
which Inkatha members internalized the views expressed by Mangosuthu Buthelezi, was 
examined. Thereafter, attention was given to individual cases which came before the TRC 
and to evidence in support of Buthelezi's possession of charisma, which was found in the 
works of Matthew Kentridge and John Aitchison. 
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Brewer's 1980 Survey 
The purpose of the survey undertaken by Brewer was that of attempting to establish the 
degree of coherency between the views expressed by Buthelezi and those of his followers419. 
In order to achieve this, a sample survey of Inkatha membership in the township of 
Kwamashu was undertaken in 198042°. The sample was reflective of the larger population of 
Zulu males who possessed legal residential rights in K wamashu and multi-stage sampling 
was undertaken so as to obtain randomization42I . Members of Inkatha were identified by a 
filter question which asked the respondents which political affiliation they supported422 . 
Those who named Inkatha as the political organisation of choice were asked further questions 
and those who did not mention that they supported Inkatha functioned as the control group421. 
Brewer refers to the theory of political immunization which suggests that when coherency 
exists between the opinions of the members of an organization and those enshrined in the 
organizations official ideology, the levels of loyalty appear higher424. The theory suggests 
furthermore that when members utilize the ideological categories of the organization or party 
over a length of time, the loyalty on the part of members to the organization increases still 
419 Brewer 1985, 57 
420 Ibid 
421 Ibid 58 
422 Ibid 
423 Ibid 
424 Ibid 
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further425 • As has been mentioned in the historical chapter, Buthelezi was considered to be 
moderate in the early 1980's and he was well known for his commitment to non-violence. 
When the commitment to non-violence was tested on his support base, the evidence gleaned 
concurred that they too were in support of a non-violent resistance stance to Apartheid426 • 91, 
8% Of the sample were against non-violence with the opposition to it being most plentiful 
amongst Inkatha members427• 
Brewer also tested for congruency between Inkatha supporters and Buthelezi with respect to 
their views on a power-sharing agreement to put an end to Apartheid governance, which 
would be inclusive of all races. He found that 89, 5% of all Inkatha supporters were 
supportive of the view on power-sharing which Buthelezi promulgated at this time428 • This 
survey provides empirical evidence to support the claim that Buthelezi's support base shared 
his views on adopting a strategy of non-violence and that of striving to attain a multiracial 
power-sharing agreement for a new government. This survey is meaningful in the context of 
this thesis in that it speaks to a coherency between the will of Buthelezi and those of his 
followers, with respect to both of the survey questions which were posed an overwhelming 
majority of his supporters shared his beliefs on these issues. In and of itself although 
illuminating, the survey is not entirely convincing with respect to establishing the existence 
of a high level of congruency between the personal will of Buthelezi and the personal wills' 
of his individual supporters. This survey is only relevant to a specific period in time and this 
425 Ibid 
426 Ibid, 59 
427 Ibid 
428 Ibid, 61 
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places certain limitations on its findings. If more surveys of this kind had been done over 
time, the findings generated might have been more beneficial as a trend could have come to 
the fore. However, as no such surveys have been done, I turned to the area in which 
Brewer's survey had occurred, Kwamashu, and looked at TRC cases which related to this 
specific location with the hope of finding evidence to suggest that the will of Buthelezi and 
those of his followers in this area had remained congruent over time. 
The testimonies brought before the TRC put into stark relief the references which haye 
previously been made to Buthelezi's non-violent strategy and his followers support thereof. 
Buthelezi's break with the ANC has been discussed in the Contextual Chapter and his moye 
toward a more violent strategy has in addition been referred to. What is interesting to note 
here is that as Buthelezi's ideological stance toward the issue of non-violence changed over 
the years, so apparently did the view of his followers. Those living in K wamashu who were 
previously a sample group of a larger number of Zulu individuals, who formerly supported 
Buthelezi's strategy of non-violence, appeared according to TRC accounts, to have changed 
their stance on this issue and seemed to have adopted the view that as Zulu people, they 
needed to protect themselves from the threat of the ANC and its affiliates, even if this meant 
resorting to violence. The following case is provided so as to offer evidence in support of the 
assertion which relates to the congruency that appears to exist between Buthelezi's will and 
the will of his followers. 
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Cases brought before the TRC 
Almost half of the total number of reports which were made to the TRC and which related to 
gross human rights violations came from the KwaZulu-Natal region429 , As such, the 
proportion of submissions made when compared to the population size of KwaZulu-Natal, 
indicates that this region had a four times higher gross human rights violation reporting rate 
than the rest of the country did43o, The commission identified lnkatha as a perpetrator of 
gross human rights violations from the year of 1983431 , Its findings also included a peak in 
the violence attributed to lnkatha in 1989 to 1990 and again in 1993432, The majority of the 
statements made to the TRC in this region related to violence which occurred between 
supporters of lnkatha and those of the UDF433 , 
The AmaSinyora Gang (1980's - early 1990's) 
In the Kwamashu township which is situated north of Durban (and which provided Brewer 
with his sample group), in 1987 the AmaSinyora gang was founded434 , This group comprised 
of lnkatha-supporting vigilantes whose goal it was to oppose UDF-aligned activists in this 
429 South Africa, Truth & Reconciliation Commission 1998, Volume 3 Chapter 3:2 
430 Ibid 
431 Ibid, 3 
432 Ibid 
433 Ibid,S 
434 Ibid, 42 
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specific area435 , The TRC found the AmaSinyora gang to be responsible for numerous 
violent attacks on UDF-aligned activists and they described this group as carrying out a 
'reign of terror' from the late 1980's to 1991, evidence brought before the commission also 
suggested that their violent activities resurfaced in 1994436. A founding member of the 
AmaSinyora gang, Bheki Mvubu, conceded to the commission that he had burnt eight to ten 
houses in which UDF affiliates resided and that in addition, he had been part of an attack in 
which approximately forty UDF supporters had been killed437. Bheki Mvubu also stated that 
in 1988 he met with Inkatha leader for Lindelani, Thomas Shabalala, who supplied the 
AmaSinyora with shotguns and bullets and who was very positive with respect to the attacks 
which they were perpetuating against UDF supporters438. Mr. Shabalala became the 
AmaSinyora's high ranking contact person and he was approached on multiple occasions for 
h f · . . . d 439 t e purpose 0 attammg money, ammumtIOn an guns . According to the Human Rights 
Commission, the AmaSinyora members were implicated in 291 attacks for the period 
between 1989 and 1990, one hundred of which were killings44o. The township in which the 
majority of individuals had previously adopted Buthelezi's strategy of non-violence was now 
a completely different place. Many were now involved in perpetuating the new strategy 
which was that of violently eliminating the opposition. 
435 Ibid 
436 Ibid 
437 Ibid 
438 Ibid 
439 Ibid 
440 Ibid, 43 
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Tile Ongoye Massacre - 1983 
On 29 October 1983 five students were killed and many others injured by vigilantes at 
Ongoye, where Buthelezi was chancellor of the University of the Universit/41 . Those who 
were harmed had been singing songs which spoke of Buthelezi in a derogatory fashion442 • 
Chief Buthelezi had wanted to use the campus as the venue to commemorate the death of 
King Cetshwayo and certain students protested against this, with some of them singing and 
speaking of Buthelezi in a derogatory manner443 . As a result of this many of these students 
were assaulted and those who were killed, died from stab wounds inflicted by traditional 
weapons444 . 
Tile Sarmcol Strike -1985 
The following case gives testament to the power of Buthelezi's words and how oftentimes it 
appears that they resulted in violent action. In May of 1985 workers at the BTR Sarmcol 
Factory near Howick, went on strike445 . They demanded that their union, the Metal and 
Allied Workers Union (MA WU) be recognized by management446 . Instead of the recognition 
441 South Africa. Truth & Reconciliation Commission 1998, Volume 3 Chapter 3:22 
442 Kentridge 1990, 220 
443 South Africa. Truth & Reconciliation Commission 1998, Volume 3 Chapter 3:22 
444 Ibid 
445 Ibid, 63 
446 Ibid 
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of their union being the result of the strike, they all found themselves unemployed447 • 970 
Workers in total were fired448 . COSA TU created a co-op to assist the fired workers and 
much pressure was exerted on management by international, regional and local groupings to 
reinstate the ex-employees449 • This did not occur and management retained the replacement 
workers that they had employed45o • Buthelezi had spoken out against this strike and planned 
stayaways and stated that owing to his public denouncement of such activity he would view 
any attempts to forement this type of action as a direct affront to his person451 . 
On the osth of December of 1986 an Inkatha rally was held in the Mphophomeni Community 
Hall with approximately two hundred Inkatha supporters attending the meeting452 . After the 
meeting's conclusion, four well-known MA WU members were abducted and assaulted4s3 . 
Mr. Phineas Sibiya, Mr. Micca Sibiya, Mr. Simon Ngubane and Ms Flomena Mnikathi were 
dragged into the community hall where Inkatha members questioned and assaulted them4s4• 
Thereafter they were forced into a car and taken to Lions River where they were shot455 . 
Only Micca Sibiya survived and the remaining others were burnt after they were shot456 . One 
447 Ibid 
448 Ibid 
449 Ibid 
450 Ibid 
451 Kentridge 1990, 220 
452 South Africa. Truth & Reconciliation Commission 1998, Volume 3 Chapter 3:64 
453 Ibid 
454 Ibid 
455 Ibid 
456 Ibid 
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of the Inkatha members, Mr. Vela Mchunu, was prevented from testifying at the inquest into 
this attack, by Buthelezi's personal assistant, Mr. MZ Khumalo, who hid him at the Mkhuze 
camp457. Violence relating to Inkatha's anti-union stance continued and further evidence in 
support of this may be found in the case ofNkosinathi Mjoli amongst many others458. 
On 1 i h June of 1990 Nkosinathi Mjoli attended an Inkatha rally at the King Zwelethini 
Stadium which is situated in Umlazi. Mjoli was wearing a T-shirt with the following words 
printed on it, 'Workers demand a living wage,459. Certain Inkatha supporters inferred that his 
wearing of this T-shirt meant that he was part of a COSA TU affiliated union and they 
believed him to be a comrade460. When the rally concluded Inkatha members confronted 
Mjoli in the toilet of the stadium and stabbed him to death461 . 
'View from the oppostion' - 1986 
The following evidence presents the manner in which some ANC members saw Buthelezi, 
with this in tum laying testament to the plausibility of classifying him as a charismatic leader. 
In 1996 a document was submitted to the TRC by Buthelezi, Dr. Ben Ngubane (former 
Agricultural and Finance Member of the Executive Council) and Dr. Frank Mdlalose (then 
457 Ibid 
458 Ibid, 46 
459 Ibid 
460 Ibid 
461 Ibid 
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Inkatha National Chairman), which detailed plans reportedly made by Umkhonto we Sizwe 
(MK) to assassinate Buthelezi in 1987462. According to this document Reverend Londa 
Shembe, a former leader of the Church of Nazareth, provided Buthelezi with the details of 
this assassination plan463 . The document revealed that in February of 1986, Shembe had 
attended a meeting at a hotel in Swaziland at which senior members of MK were present464, 
He claimed that at this meeting, the plans for Buthelezi's assassination in 1987 had been 
discussed465 . In a letter which Shembe wrote to Buthelezi in March of 1986 he stated that the 
ANC had recruited MK commander, Terence Tyrone, who Shembe noted was a 'coloured 
fellow' to assassinate Buthelezi466 . He noted furthermore in the letter that 'their opinion is 
that Your Royal Highness is the only person who can hold Inkatha together and that you 
cannot be replaced,467. They say therefore that if they should succeed, Inkatha would 
disintegrate,468. These last two statements by senior members of MK suggest that even 
Inkatha's opposition recognized Buthelezi's charismatic appeal. Shembe's claims relating to 
the existence of a plan to assassinate Buthelezi was corroborated by the director of the 
Terrorism Research Centre, who claimed that he had obtained information to this effect469 . 
462 South African Press Association 1996 
463 Ibid 
464 Ibid 
465 Ibid 
466 Ibid 
467 Ibid 
468 Ibid 
469 Ibid 
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In response to this assassination plan, the clandestine paramilitary training of approximately 
two hundred Inkatha supporters in the Caprivi region in Namibia occurred47o. This operation 
became known as 'Operation Marion,471. In September of 1986 the Caprivi trainees went 
home to both KwaZulu and Natal and they were deployed throughout this region472 . At the 
Durban Supreme Court during the K waMakhutha trial 37 of 1996, evidence emerged which 
suggested that the Caprivi trainees were responsible for killing in January of 1987 thirteen 
people, the majority of whom were women and children in the home of UDF leader, Bheki 
Ntuli473 . Furthermore, findings by the commission suggested that the Caprivi trainees took 
control of Mpumalanga in March of 1989474. In this region they performed hit-squad 
activities as well as in Pietermaritzburg for approximately two years against members of the 
UDFIANC475 .. 
470 South Africa. Truth & Reconciliation Commission 1998, Volume 3 Chapter 3:48 
471 Ibid 
472 Ibid 
473 Ibid 
474 Ibid, 52 
475 Ibid 
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Evidence found in the work of Matthew Kentridge (1990) and John Aitchison (2003) 
The case of Chief Maphumulo -1983 (Aitchison) 
Amongst Buthelezi's support in the KwaZulu government it appears that there was little 
tolerance for any form of disloyalty to their leader476, Evidence of this is provided through 
the actions taken against Inkatha Chief Hlabunzima Maphumulo of Table Mountain, which is 
a 'tribal' area located approximately fifteen kilometres outside of Pietermaritzburg477, Chief 
Maphumulo was described as somewhat of a 'maverick chief, made popular by his refusal to 
toe the party line478, Chief Maphumulo had disagreed with Chief Buthelezi on several 
occasions and had attempted to stop Inkatha from using Table Mountain for their meetings in 
the early 1980's479, Oscar Dhlomo, who was the Secretary General of Inkatha, stated the 
following in response to Chief Maphumulo' s disobedience; 'the full might ofInkatha will be 
unleashed' against Maphumulo, who was eventually fired with Chief Bangukhosi Mduli 
replacing him as Chairman of the Mpumalanga Regional Authority48o, In October of 1983 
Chief Maphumulo was severely beaten outside of the K waZulu Legislative Assembly by 
members of the Inkatha Youth Brigade for his 'disrespectful attitude' 48 1 , 
476 Aitchison 2003, 56 
477 Ibid 
478 Kentridge 1990, 165 
479 Aitchison 2003, 56 
480 Ibid 
481 Ibid 
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Peace Talks -1989 (Kentridge) 
The following case provides the personal testimony of Thandeka Gqubule, who attended an 
Inkatha rally in 1989 and in addition speaks to the violence which emerged after an Imbizo 
held by King Zwelithini and Buthelezi in this same year, with both of these discussions 
serving to provide evidence in support of Buthelezi's possession of charisma. In the early 
half of 1989 proposed peace talks between the ANC, Cosatu and Inkatha gained much 
publicity482. On the 23 of April of 1989 Inkatha organised a number of prayer meetings 
throughout Natal and the Midlands region483 . At these meetings a speech written by 
Buthelezi was read, which detailed his own peace proposals484 • He called for international 
funding to assist in peace processes, the use of technology to assist in broadcasting the 
negotiations towards peace and the use of peace-keeping field units as well as joint 
monitoring structures485 . Buthelezi also agreed that he would be willing to work together 
with the UDF and Cosatu, so as to reach an agreement around a plan to institute peace in the 
region486• Cosatu and the UDF responded favourably and produced a document in lieu of this 
entitled, 'An End to Violence and Peace in Natal - the Position of Cosatu and UDF 
qfjiliates,487. They noted that 'We share with Inkatha a common view and commitment to a 
mass movement for peace. Whilst COSA TU and the UDF largely share a common political 
482 Kentridge 1990, 166 
483 Aitchison 2003, 68 
484 Ibid 
485 Ibid 
486 Kentridge 1990, 166 
487 Ibid 
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position which differs from that of Inkatha, all three organisations share an abhorrence of 
apartheid and are committed to achieving peace in Natal,488. Buthelezi's response to this 
statement was not at all positive. He emphasized that in order for peace processes to work 
the 'mudslinging' from UDF and COSATU quarters had to come to an end, he stated that 
'We are maligned by the very parties who now want us to join in peace initiatives with 
them,489. Buthelezi, together with the Inkatha Central Committee, rejected the peace plan 
proposed by the UDFICOSATU490. Despite this attempts towards peace talks went ahead4(iJ. 
On the loth of May of 1989 the ANC in exile stated that they would enter into peace talks 
with Buthelezi492. On this same day Buthelezi agreed to meet with representatives of Cosatu 
and of the UDF493 . Subsequent to this meeting two other meetings between Inkatha, Cosatu 
and UDF members occurred in Durban on the 19th and 23rd of June of 1989494. Attempts 
toward peace appeared positive and peace rallies were held in various townships in support of 
this. Thandeka Gqubule had the following to say in the 21 July edition of the Weekly Mail 
about an Inkatha peace rally held in Imbali495 . 
'In contrast with UDF and COSATU rallies, where no single leader stands out, the Inkatha 
rallies are marked by a 'personality cult '........ This week an Inkatha peace rally in 
488 Kentridge 1990, 166 
489 Ibid 
490 Ibid, 167 
491 Ibid 
492 Aitchison 2003, 70 
493 Ibid 
494 Ibid 
495 Kentridge 1990, 168 
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Imbali .......... was characterized by frenzied praise and showers of gifts for the man who is at 
once Inkatha president, KwaZulu's chief minister and minister of police, and chancellor of 
the University of Zululand. ........ Buthelezi 's elevation above the political organization of 
which he is president was evident, as the legislative assembly of KwaZulu and members of the 
cabinet sat forgotten in the grandstand, while Buthelezi basked alone in the limelight '. 
She went on to describe the many gifts received by Buthelezi and spoke of the songs and 
speeches of praise which were given in his honour496 , In the speech presented at this rally 
Buthelezi demanded that Inkatha be included in the Mass Democratic Movement and he 
called for the release of all political prisoners497 . Gqubule noted that Buthelezi's utterances 
were in fact 'drowned out by the applause which he received and in a sense lost in the 
spectacular nature of the event498 . 
By August of 1989 there was a hopeful atmosphere in Natal, where according to Monitors at 
the CAE at the University of Natal, the death toll had decreased since May of 1989499• 
However on the 23rd of September Buthelezi announced a moratorium on further peace 
talks50o . He stated that he had found two pamphlets which had been issued by 
UDF/COSATU supporters and the exiled South African Congress of Trade Unions 
496 Ibid 
497 Ibid 
498 Ibid 
499 Ibid, 169 
500 Ibid 
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(SACTU), which conveyed the message that comrades in the Pietermaritzburg region should 
exploit the peace negotiations so as to gain leverage over Inkathasol . The UDF ICOSA TU and 
SACTU all denied their involvement with the production of these pamphlets claiming that 
they were forgeriesso2. Buthelezi did not accept this explanation and peace talks came to a 
haltSo3. 
In mid November of this same year an Imbizo was held by King Zwelithini in Durbans'14, 
The King together with Buthelezi spoke of the ANC, UDF and of Cosatu in an antagonistic 
manner
sos
. The King said the following; 'I speak now as King of the Zulus and I say: let no 
party attack my peopleso6. I say to the leadership of the ANC, Cosatu and the UDF: leave 
my people alone and let them do their Zulu thingSo7., Chief Buthelezi responded by 
emphasizing that the King was always to be viewed as being above party politics and then he 
stated that 'You know that the UDF and Cosatu have come into your midst to tum you 
against Inkatha,so8. He noted furthermore that one of the reasons behind the calling of the 
Imbizo was to put an end to the ANC, UDF and COSATU vilification of himso9. Buthelezi 
added, 'The killing-talk, the hurling of insults, the singing of vile songs about the leader of 
501 Ibid 
502 Ibid 
503 Ibid 
504 Aitchison 2003, 71 
505 Ibid, 72 
506 Ibid 
507 Ibid 
508 Ibid 
509 Ibid 
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the Zulu nation, all make up a recipe for killing,51O. Shorty after this Imbizo took place a 
number of attacks occurred in the Mpumalanga region for the duration of more than a week 
by Inkatha supporters levied against members of the UDF and its affiliates511. The month of 
December saw more deaths as Inkatha followers targeted neighbouring townships in 
Durban512. The violence which emerged after the imbizo at which Buthelezi spoke at, may 
be indicative of the trust and loyalty which his followers awarded to him. 
Mudslinging and Train Violence - 1990 (Aitchison) 
On the 24th of July of 1990 the first reported incident of train violence occurred in Soweto, 
the motivation behind this attack appeared to be that of the perpetrators anger towards the 
UDF for allegedly insulting their chief, Mangosuthu Buthelezi513 • A large group of Zulu 
'warriors' gave testament to their loyalty to Buthelezi when they stormed a train at the Ikwezi 
station514. The following day was characterized by the same event occurring515. On this 
second day the Zulu attackers had knobkerries, iron bars and pangas in their possession516. 
They chanted a traditional Zulu war cry known as 'Usuthu,517. Many commuters were 
510 Ibid 
511 Ibid 
512 Ibid 
513 Aitchison 2003, 105 
514 Ibid 
515 Ibid 
516 Ibid 
517 Ibid 
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harmed and a woman was thrown to her death from a moving train518 . When the train slowed 
down and the commuters began to stone their attackers, they fled from the train and sought 
refuge in the Jabulani Hostel which was situated nearby519. In response to the accusations 
made against Inkatha for the role which they played in the train violence, Themba Khoza, an 
Inkatha supporter, did not openly admit to Inkatha's involvement he did however have the 
following to say; 'The only thing we can say, is not to humiliate Chief Buthelezi by singing 
derogatory songs about him because that creates tension and subsequently leads to 
conflict' 520. A short time prior to this event on the 4th of July of 1990 Buthelezi had once 
again condemned the 'derogatory epithets' which he believed the ANC used to describe him 
at the launch which took place to celebrate the renaming ofInkatha, which as of the 04th July 
of 1990 became the IFp521 . 
When attempting to assess whether or not a political leader qualifies as a charismatic leader, 
the following questions may be posed. Firstly, does he/she elicit an intense emotional 
response from individuals and secondly, do individuals experience a sense of the loss of their 
own personal will when in the proximity of the leader? In response to these two questions 
and in lieu of the above evidence it does appear to be the case that Buthelezi did indeed elicit 
a strong emotional response from certain individuals and in addition to this, he also 
engendered the sense of a loss of personal will on the part of his followers. This conclusion 
could be criticized however, on the following grounds. It may be suggested that what is 
518 Ibid 
519 Ibid 
520 Ibid, 106 
521 Ibid 
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revealed in this evidence has more to do with emotions emanating from supporters of an 
ethnically defined party, and less to do with an individual leader and the emotions which he 
elicits. The idea expressed in this possible critique is that people were not loyal to Buthelezi. 
Nor did they trust him or experience a loss of their own sense of personal will in relation to 
him. This counter argument may suggest that the trust and loyalty of individuals was won by 
a party that was mobilized around Zulu ethnicity. In line with this, it may be argued that 
individual personal will became synonymous with the ideology espoused by Inkatha, as it 
was believed by many that this was a party which sought to advance the interests of all Zulu 
people522 . 
This argument when probed is not entirely convincing. In response to it, the following two 
key points are raised firstly, the duration of Buthelezi's leadership of Inkatha and secondly, 
the decreasing electoral support gleaned in KwaZulu Natal by the IFP since the year 1994523 . 
Buthelezi founded the second Inkatha in 1975 and since this time, he has been the only 
president of the movement, which then became a political party prior to the first democratic 
elections in 1994524 • It is most difficult to separate Buthelezi as an individual from 
InkathalIFP, he founded the movement and has shaped it himself. When thinking of Inkatha 
or the IFP, it is Buthelezi's face that immediately comes to mind. As such, to claim that the 
emotions presented in the evidence are levied towards a party and not towards its leader is not 
entirely convincing, as Buthelezi and InkathalIFP appear to be synonymous with one another. 
522 De Haas and Zulu 1994, 438 
5231ndependent Electoral Commission 1994, 1999, 2004 
5241nkatha Freedom Party n.d (Historical background) 
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In relation to the second point raised the following may be said. It has been argued in this 
text that Buthelezi' s status as a key national politician has thus far diminished in the 
democratic South Africa. The claim has been made which suggests that Buthelezj' s 
charismatic attributes have thus far not been able to transcend the political regime change and 
that this has contributed towards his diminished national status. What is interesting to note is 
that as his charisma has waned in the democratic context thus far, so too has the electoral 
support gleaned by the IFp525• 1994 Saw the IFP receiving 1 844070 votes in KwaZulu 
Nata1526• This figure then became 1 241 522 in 1999 and then decreased to 1 009267 in the 
2004 elections527. If the emotion reflected in the evidence was levied towards the IFP and not 
Buthelezi, then surely in the democratic context the support for the party would have been 
more enduring. This has not been the case to date. As Buthelezi's charisma diminished so 
too has the support for the IFP. As such, this key critique of the manner in which the 
empirical evidence has been interpreted in this text, does not prove to be entirely convincing. 
From the evidence presented it does indeed seem plausible to claim that Buthelezi, during the 
Apartheid era, may have been classified as a leader in possession of charismatic qualities. 
Charismatic leadership in the democratic context 
During the era of Apartheid, Buthelezi found himself in an extremely powerful position. 
Politically, he dominated K waZu1u. In 1972, during the time which Buthe1ezi held the 
position of Chief Executive Councillor of the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly, an opposition 
525 Independent Electoral Commission 1994, 1999, 2004 
526 Independent Electoral Commission 1994 
527 Ibid 1999, 2004 
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party known as the Zulu National Party, led by occasional editor of Africa South, Lloyd 
Ndaba, formed to challenge his plans for the KwaZulu Homeland528. The party comprised of 
city dwellers however, it was also awarded the backing of traditionalists529. Those who 
supported it included Prince Israel, Prince Patrick, Prince Clement, a business mogul from 
Soweto, E.B. Tshabalala and A.W.G. Champion, who was a Zulu political leader during the 
time of the existence of the Industrial and Commercial Workers Union of the 1920' S530. The 
Zulu National Party competed in an Urban Council election in Umlazi against Buthelezi 
however, they did not enjoy success53I. 
One year later another opposition party known as, Umkhonto ka Shaka (Shaka's Spear), 
emerged to challenge Buthelezi532. This party was in favour of separate development, which 
Buthelezi was against (see contextual chapter) and was led by Prince David Zulu, Chief 
Charles Hlengwa, Abel Mhlongo, Lloyd Ndaba and some former members of the defeated 
Zulu National Party533. In 1974 it emerged that this party was receiving funding from the 
Republic's Bureau of State Security534. In this same year King Goodwill Zwelithini criticized 
the party and twenty-five of the twenty-six who were members of the Umbumbulu Regional 
Authority, of which Chief Hlengwa was chairman, resigned and as such he lost his position in 
528 Butler, Rotberg and Adams 1977, 57 
529 Ibid 
530 Ibid 
531 Ibid 
532 Ibid 
533 Ibid 
534 Ibid 
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the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly and Shaka's spear no longer constituted a challenge to 
Buthelezi535 . 
Two other opposition parties formed in the wake ofUmkhonto's demise536. The Zulu Labour 
Party, led by church leader Uvulamehlo Izimtuphuthe, was formed and in addition a party 
known as, 'the voice of the people', led by Champion A.E. Buthelezi of Dassenhoek and 
Lawrence and Paulos Nxele, emerged in 1974537. These parties met with little success and in 
this same year, Buthelezi proposed to the Assembly that opposition parties ought not to exist 
in KwaZulu, as culturally consensus based decision making was practiced and opposition 
politics according to Buthelezi, worked in a manner which was contrary to this538 . The 
motion was approved by the Assembly however, it was denied in 1975 by the Minister of 
Bantu Administration and Development539. Zulu politicians did not let this deter them and 
this led to the formation of Buthelezi's lnkatha, which was to be a home to all Zulu people54il . 
The case was such that if individuals wanted to be a part of the region's Legislati\ e 
Assembly, they would have to be members of Inkatha and in addition, it was decided that the 
president ofInkatha would also be the Chief Minister of KwaZulu541 . 
535 Ibid 
536 Ibid 
537 Ibid 
538 Ibid 
539 Ibid 
540 Ibid 
541 Ibid 
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When Buthelezi became Chief Minister of KwaZulu he controlled the manner lil which 
pensions were administered, the provision of healthcare, he oversaw the functioning of the 
police, managed education and even handled the funding for flood relief in the region542. In 
addition, the distribution of land also fell under the auspices of his contro1543. This intense 
degree of personalized power which Buthelezi enjoyed during the Apartheid era has 
dissipated upon the advent of democracy in the country. Whilst working within the 
Apartheid regime, Buthelezi was given the space to publicly display his charismatic attributes 
and to attract support, People listened to Buthelezi because he convinced people of the 
importance of his status as a Zulu chief who also had the approval of King Goodwill 
Z 1· h' . h f h' 544 we It lilI, a nep ew 0 IS . As discussed earlier, none of the other parties which 
attempted to challenge Buthelezi in the early 1970's enjoyed this same luxury545. Upon the 
awarding of the position of Chief Minister of K waZulu to Buthelezi, he effectively dominated 
the region. With no opposition he was awarded centre-stage and was given the freedom to 
promote his particular reading of Zulu history546. This history spoke of the superiority of the 
Zulu nation and was to lay the foundation for his successful engagement with the process of 
ethnic mobilization547. It also promoted the idea that as a chief of such a powerful nation, he 
ought to be treated with respect and rewarded with loyaltl48 . 
542Charney 1991, 10 
~3Szeftel 1994, 192 
544 Adam and Moodley 1992, 500 
545 Butler, Rotberg and Adams 1977, 57 
546 Waetjen 1999, 653 
547 Ibid 
548 Ibid 
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Ethnic mobilization, which will be discussed in detail in the following chapter, created for 
Buthelezi an extremely large constituency549. As mentioned earlier on in this section, 
Buthelezi received the loyalty of a large group of Zulu people, who were willing to engage in 
activities which could potentially be harmful to them, because they trusted him to protect 
their interests and in fact they believe that his interests and their own, were synonymous55iJ. 
The evidence provided in this chapter, suggests that a sense of the loss of individual will on 
the part of Buthelezi's constituents occurred and in addition, that he elicited from them an 
intense level of emotional commitment551 . 
The country's transition to democracy had a dire impact upon the level of power enjoyed by 
Buthelezi. The new democratic dispensation saw the King being paid by central government 
as opposed to being paid by Buthelezi552. When the King became aware of this information 
in the period just before the first ever democratic elections, he broke rank with Buthelezi and 
aligned with the ANC553. Buthelezi had in part drawn on the King's allegiance to gain tribal 
legitimacy; this support which he could publicise had helped to give him status554. Without 
King Zwelithini's support, it may be argued that Buthelezi's legitimacy as a traditional Zulu 
chief was called into question. 
549 Southall 19811 455 
550Ashforth 1991/ 65 
551 Willner 1984, 8 
552 Van Kessel and Oomen 1997, 570 
553 Ibid 
554 Butlerl Rotberg and Adams 1977, 57 
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The dominance of the political landscape of KwaZulu which Buthelezi enjoyed in the 
Apartheid era has been eroded upon in the country's new democratic dispensation555 . 
Opposition to the IFP, made manifest through the ANC in particular, is now to be found in 
KwaZulu and in addition, Buthelezi's access to state resources has diminished556. He no 
longer has the same political space or financing to mobilize people around ethnicity and as 
such his constituency has waned557• Regarding this reference is made to the 2004 provincial 
election results, the ANC attained 46.98% of the vote whilst the IFP received only 36.82%558. 
Buthelezi's charisma has waned in the democratic context because he no longer has the 
political space to publicise himself and in this way endear people to his cause. 
Chapter Five: Buthelezi and ethnicity 
Why did Buthelezi need Inkatha? 
This text argues that Buthelezi, through his possession of charisma, was able to make use of 
the complicated South African social, economic and political landscape, to successfully carry 
out the process of ethnic mobilization. The task of effective ethnic mobilization was not one 
which was simple. As Buthelezi began to ascend within the Apartheid state structures in the 
555 Adam & Moodley 1992, 509 
556 Van Kessel and Oomen 1997, 570 
557 Adam & Moodley 1992, 509 
558 Independent Electoral Commission 2004 
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early 1970's, he increasingly came under attack for his career 'progression,559. The black 
youth in particular, who were represented by SASO (see contextual chapter), were extremely 
antagonistic towards him, as were the members of the Natal Trade Union Movement560. In 
the face of such obvert criticism, Buthelezi created a political party which would allow for 
him to possess an organized constituency, which could be mobilized so as to quell this 
criticism561 . Not only would this political party serve to provide him with real support in 
terms of addressing the criticisms levied against him from those organizations representing 
black interests, but the presence of an organized and sizeable support base, would also mark 
him as a power to be reckoned with, with respect to Pretoria's conception of him. Thus in 
order to advance in terms of his political career, creating a party was an essential part of 
ensuring Buthelezi's success. Working as an individual would not ensure this, but with a 
constituency which could be mobilized so as to influence the decision making processes of 
other power players, success would be easier to secure. 
When the second version of Inkatha was born in 1975, Chief Buthelezi occupied the most 
central position; indeed he was the reason behind its inception. As mentioned in the 
contextual chapter, the first Inkatha ka Zulu was founded in 1923 by King Solomon 
kaDinizulu, for the purpose of protecting Zulu culture562. The constitution which Buthelezi 
made use of for his version of Inkatha was in essence very similar in composition to the first 
559 Mzala 1988, 116 
560 Ibid 
561 Ibid 
562 Golan 1991, 113 
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movement's constitution563 . With respect to this, Buthelezi's party was to be one which was 
ethnically based from the start564 . 
Buthelezi's ethnic mobilization 
For reasons of clarity, the definition of an ethnic group is repeated. Its members have a 
cultural affinity with one another, they have a shared history which speaks to the origin of the 
group and in addition, they regard themselves as unique to other groups565. The question 
which will be addressed in this second part of the chapter comprises of two parts: Firstly, 
how did Buthelezi set about forging the parameters of the Zulu ethnic group and secondly, 
how did he manage to make ethnicity the most salient part of the social identities of the many 
individuals who were residing in K waZulu? I commence with a discussion which speaks to 
the first part of the question. 
A shared history 
Buthelezi needed to present a reading of Zulu history which would paint him in a favourable 
light and which would assist in legitimizing some of the actions undertaken by him, which 
were being criticised by black people in particular566. A few brief examples of that which 
563 Ibid 
564 Ibid 
565 Mare 1993, 11 
566 Mzala 1988, 116 
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formed a part of Buthelezi's reading of Zulu history will be presented. In various speeches 
Buthelezi spoke of the Zulu people as a group which had always been homogenous and 
which had fought and won against the colonial powers, who sought to drive them out of the 
specific region that they had traditionally occupied567. He claimed that this area constituted 
the homeland of K waZulu and that it in fact had always been home to the Zulu people, even 
prior to the commencement of Apartheid568. At this point it is important to recall specific 
assertions made in the earlier contextual chapter. Alternate readings of Zulu history point to 
the belief that Zululand was populated by a multitude of different groupings such as the 
Xhosa and Tsonga569. In addition to this, competing historical accounts argue that the Zulu 
people have historically been deeply divided along different lines such as that of spirituality 
for example (see contextual chapter).57o 
Buthelezi's choice to utilize the reading of history which claims that Zulu people were 
traditionally a homogenous group and that they as this unified grouping occupied KwaZulu 
was made so as to legitimize his involvement with the Apartheid state. His acceptance of 
the position of Prime Minister of KwaZulu was sanctioned by the particular reading of Zulu 
history which he chose to espouse57l .In addition to this, Shaka, Cetshwayo and Dingane 
amongst other legendary warriors and members of the royal house, as has previously been 
567 Szeftel 1994, 194 
568 Mare 1992, 64 
569 Gump 1990, 34 
570 De Villiers Minnaar 1991, 5 
571 Mare 1992, 64 
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alluded to, featured prominently in Buthelezi's reading of Zulu historyS72. The following 
quote taken from a speech he gave to a group of people in Umbongintwini in 1976 illustrates 
this assertion. 'I am a great-grandson of King Cetshwayo, a grandson of King Dinizulu and 
the son of Princess Magogo, the full sister of King Solomon ka Dinizulu, and am a member 
of the Zulu Royal House in my own right.. ................ .I acted as Prime Minister to King 
Cyprian, who was my first cousin, for 16 years, before there was any separate development of 
politics in KwaZulu,s73. This focus on royal blood in particular was not without purpose. 
In the previous chapter it has been mentioned that during his recounting of this glorious past 
at various public events, the presence of King Goodwill Zwelithini KaBekhezulu at his side 
was not in the least uncommonS74. The value of historical royalty was highlighted by 
Buthelezi in speech and this was reinforced still further by him almost always having the 
Zulu King at his side. The attention given to royalty in Buthelezi's version of the past, 
afforded him the opportunity to validate that institution in more contemporary times. This 
was beneficial to Buthelezi for the following two reasons. Firstly as mentioned in the 
previous chapter, with the King at his side Buthelezi gained historical legitimacy. He had 
foregrounded the virtues of Shaka who was of royal blood and in so doing he demanded 
respect for the royal institution of which King Zwelithini was a part. With the latter at his 
side and sanctioning his activities, Buthelezi created a situation in which not only did King 
Zwelithini support him, but those of old such as Shaka did too. A second benefit awarded to 
Buthelezi through the recounting of his specific reading of history was the following; making 
572 Campbell, Mare and Walker 1995, 293 
573 Buthelezi 1979, 61 
574 Waetjen 1999, 660 
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salient the issue of royalty afforded Buthelezi the opportunity to have people view themselves 
as subjects to authority, as opposed to viewing themselves as individuals who were capable 
of making their own decisions575. A group of subjects rather than of critical individuals 
would make for a much more malleable constituency. 
We are unique 
Numerous instances have been recorded in which Buthelezi differentiates between the Zulu 
'nation' and the 'others,576. In addition to this, the Zulu ethnic group is always described as 
more superior to those who form part of other ethnic affiliations577. In order to solidify the 
distinction between the Zulu nation and other ethnic groups, Buthelezi would often refer for 
example to the military might of Zulu men and he described them as 'brothers born of warrior 
stock,578. Zulu women in tum were given status as they were viewed as being 'the bearers of 
warriors' 579. 
575 Mare 1992, 64 
576 Szeftel 1994, 194 
577 lbid 
578 Ibid 
5791bid 
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Moulding cultural affinity 
As referred to in the Conceptual Chapter, certain symbols become the means by which 
individuals identify with the group to which they belong58o. With respect to this, the military 
might of the Zulu nation, as well as being one of the reasons as to why the Zulus were 
perceived to be different to other groups of people, was used by Buthelezi as a symbolic 
value which would assist in binding the Zulu people together581 . However, more interesting 
is the fact that Buthelezi developed a situation in which he in and of himself, became the 
symbolic representation ofthe Zulu nation582. Buthelezi, through the process of convincingly 
utilizing a specific reading of history, was able to gain historical legitimacy and as such, he 
afforded himself the opportunity to become the personal embodiment of all that was Zulu. 
With reference to this, Buthelezi revealed what exactly being Zulu entailed to his subjects. 
He ensured that he became the living symbol of Zulu culture. 
Recruiting a constituency 
How did Buthelezi set about rendering ethnicity the most salient part of the social identities 
of those residing in KwaZulu? The previous section illustrates the manner in which 
Buthelezi created the definite parameters of a Zulu ethnic group. Not only did he set these 
parameters, but as mentioned, he became the personal embodiment of all that was Zulu. The 
path had been cleared for the process of recruiting members to Inkatha. He had developed a 
580 Mare 1993, 12 
581 Ibid 
582 Mare 1993, 53 
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situation in which he had historically, legitimate authority and as such, he was able to tum 
many of those who identified themselves as being part of the Zulu ethnic group into members 
of his political party, Inkatha. Buthelezi dictated what it meant to be Zulu and in line with 
this, being Zulu meant being a member of Inkatha. Buthelezi spoke of the Zulu nation and of 
Inkatha in a synonymous fashion; an example cited earlier on in the text is recounted here to 
illustrate this assertion. At a Shaka Day rally which was held in Clermont, Durban in 
1986583 • Posters read as follows: 'All proud Zulus' ............ 'Mighty Nation' ................. .. 
'SHOW THAT WE ARE PROUD OF OUR LEADERS AND THAT WE BACK THEM,58.l. 
The posters also clearly illustrated that it was Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi, president of the 
Inkatha movement, who was the man of the day and the person who, together with his party, 
was going to work to improve the living conditions of all Zulu people585. 
Not only did Buthelezi define that which was Zulu in order to mobilize a constituency, he 
also instilled in people a fear of those who were part of other ethnic groupings, in this way 
making ethnicity the most salient feature in the social identities of those living in K waZulu. 
Painting an image of those who were not Zulu (particularly ANC members) as being anti-
Zulu, assisted Buthelezi with the task of developing a loyal constituency. 
Whilst it is clearly the case that ethnic mobilization presented itself as a viable strategy to 
employ in the quest to gamer support for Inkatha in the pre-democratic period of South 
583 De Haas and Zulu 1994,438 
584 Ibid 
585 Ibid 
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Africa's history. In the country's post democratic transition period, the IFP as it is now 
known has been hard-pressed to distance itself from its ethnic history. This begs the 
question, why is the strategy of ethnic mobilization no longer overtly employed by the IFP? 
Ethnic mobilization and democracy: Then and now 
The final adoption of the South African Constitution in 1996 greatly impinged upon 
Buthelezi's capacity to successfully mobilize a constituency around ethnicity. No special 
status is given to any group identity in the constitution be it a religious, language or ethnic 
based affiliation586• In the country's current political landscape an individual's right to 
practice religion, to speak their mother tongue and to have their ethnic identity protected are 
concretized in a bill of rights587. However, it is important to note that it is the individual's 
right to certain freedoms and that of protection, which is found in the constitution and no 
special group dispensations are advocated588• 
Where previously Buthelezi was rewarded by the Apartheid state both financially and with 
respect to his career development for the politicization of ethnicity, this is clearly no longer 
the case589. With respect to this, Buthelezi's focus on ethnic exclusivity was directly in line 
with the Apartheid government's policy of separate development. This was a policy based 
upon an idea espoused by Verwoerd, which suggested that both happiness and stability could 
586 Mare 1992, 107 
587 Ibid 
588 Ibid 
589 Adam and Moodley 1992, 488 
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only be found if each respective group of people possessed a Homeland, government and 
language which was unique to them590 . In contrast to this, the current task of South Africa's 
first democratic government is that of nation building, which entails the removal of divisions 
which exist in society, be they ethnic, religious or racially based to name but a few591 . One 
could in response to this argue that the ANC government has implemented policies such as 
Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) and Affirmative Action which some believe promote 
group favouritism. However, in response to this possible criticism it should be noted that in 
the context of this text such policies are believed to have been implemented so as to promote 
economic equality, this in turn creating a foundation upon which a truly unified nation can 
emerge. Whether these policies have been successful is not the topic of this thesis. Suffice to 
say that whether viewed as promoting group favouritism or not, institutionalized separate 
development on the economic, social and political levels is no longer a policy which is 
promoted by the new democratic government and as a result, Buthelezi is no longer rewarded 
for the promoting of such ideals. 
In addition to this, the advent of democracy in South Africa has brought with it a 
diversification in the interests of society, particularly with respect to the increasing salience 
of class and gender identities592 • During the country's Apartheid period the government 
created a system in which an individual's daily activities were dictated by the colour of their 
skin and their ethnic grouping. Those who were white benefited materially from this simple 
biological characteristic, as well as with respect to the opportunities and freedoms afforded to 
590 Verkuyl n.d 
591 ANC 52nd National Conference 2007, 1 
592 Mare 1992, 111 
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them. In contrast to this, being categorized as a person of colour meant being denied equal 
access to these same material resources, freedoms and opportunities. It was in this context of 
economic, social and political repression that race and ethnicity were made salient and the 
process of ethnic mobilization which was implemented by a charismatic leader, was able to 
take root in the country. With respect to this, Buthelezi, a charismatic individual, was able to 
create a seemingly unified Zulu 'nation', which he instilled with a fear relating to the 
supposed quest of primarily ANC members, to set about disempowering the Zulu nation and 
taking from them what little they had593 . 
To summarize, the result of the adoption of the country's very progressive constitution with 
its bill of rights precluding the development of political parties that are discriminatory in 
nature, has been a curtailment of the political space afforded to Buthelezi. In addition, the 
government of South Africa with its focus on nation building does not remunerate or support 
in any other way, a party which seeks to divide the nation along ethnic lines. Finally, the 
emergence of diversified interests within the country have had a profound effect on the 
salience of both race and ethnicity and as such, individual social identities are increasingly 
less defined by racial or ethnic salience. At this point the discussion at the end of the 
previous chapter around Buthelezi' s waning charisma in the democratic context is recalled. 
His waning charisma together with the changes described above and those to be discussed in 
the chapter to follow, are believed to be behind his decline in power in the country's 
democratic context to date. 
593 Adam and Moodley 1992, 488 
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Ethnicity and charisma 
Buthelezi had shown his charismatic personality in a public manner and people listed to him 
as he highlighted the importance of chieftainship and of royalty in a convincing manner. 
From his revered position he promulgated a reading of history which provided him with 
further legitimacy in that it sanctioned his involvement with the Apartheid state. Buthelezi 
became the symbol of 'Zuluness' and he revealed to all what exactly being Zulu meant. 
From this charismatic vantage point, Buthelezi was able to successfully carry out the process 
of ethnic mobilization. Mention has been made of the fact that certain structural factors such 
as the political, social and economic difficulties which were being experienced by black 
people in general, and in this instance by those living in K waZulu in particular, may haye 
made them more susceptible to ethnic mobilization. However, as mentioned in the literature 
review undertaken earlier, structural factors alone cannot explain the success which Buthelezi 
enjoyed in the mobilization of a Zulu constituency. If certain structural factors such as those 
referred to, which are always in existence in society, were the only pre-requisite to successful 
ethnic mobilization, then surely we would see many more instances of it occurring. 
Chapter Six: Patronage 
Buthelezi's career progression and the nature of the homeland of KwaZulu 
At the time of Inkatha's second birth in the year of 1975, Buthelezi was firmly anchored 
. h· h A h·d 594 WIt III t e part el state structures . 1970 Saw him accepting the position of Chief 
594 Mare and Hamilton 1987,46 
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Executive Officer (CEO) of the Zulu Territorial Authority (ZTA)595. The executive of the 
ZT A comprised of chiefs and their various traditional councillors, who were representative of 
a multitude of Zulu 'tribes' in Nata1596. It was an organization designed by the NP 
government to promote the implementation of the Bantu-Self Government Act of 1959, 
which sought to have the Zulu population residing in the future self-governing homeland of 
KwaZulu597. In 1972 the ZTA morphed into the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly (KLA)598. 
The creation of this assembly gave the developing Homeland of KwaZulu limited legislative 
11 . 599 as we as executIve powers . 
As CEO of the KLA, Buthelezi, together with the other executive councillors, insisted that 
the position of the Zulu king become ceremonial in nature and that this was to be formulated 
in the new constitution, which was drafted by the government for KwaZulu6oo. The central 
government granted Buthelezi a further concession when they agreed to permit him to select 
his own executive councillors6ol . These two constitutional stipulations promoted a situation 
in which Buthelezi could secure for himself a large degree of personal control over 
KwaZulu602. The King could not politically challenge him and he was able to place those 
5951nkatha Freedom Party 1999 (Biographies) 
596 Mare and Hamilton 1987,38 
597 Ibid, 36 
598 Inkatha Freedom Party 1999 (Biographies) 
599 Mare and Hamilton 1987,41 
600 Ibid 
601 Ibid, 43 
602 Mare and Hamilton 1987,42 
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who were loyal to him in the executive council of the KLA603. Buthelezi's ascent in the 
Apartheid created power structures did not end here. A year after the inception of the second 
Inkatha, Buthelezi became Chief Minister of KwaZulu, a position he held until 1994604. The 
two constitutional concessions awarded to Buthelezi and his acquiring of the position of 
Chief Minister of K waZulu, permitted him to become the chief broker of patronage in the 
region605. 
During this period K waZulu was a region characterized by both low income per capita and 
low levels of labour productivitl06. Rapid population growth in the region resulted in land 
as well as food shortages607. Another effect of the overpopulation of the area was that of 
unemployment608. KwaZulu was also characterized by an abundance of children below the 
age of fifteen, who occupied dependent roles and who as such, were economically 
unproductive609. Agriculture constituted the key economic activity however; it was practiced 
primarily in a non-commercial capacity610. The backward status of agricultural technology in 
the region, did not allow for the conversion to commercial agriculture611 . An infrastructure 
603 Ibid 
604 Dr. Mangosuthu Buthelezi, M P: President of the Inkatha Freedom Party 1999 
605 Charney 1991, 10 
606 Butler, Rotberg and Adams 1977, 122 
607 Ibid 
608 Ibid 
609 Ibid 
610 Ibid 
611 Ibid 
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for industrial development was also absent from the region612. Regarding this, KwaZulu was 
characterized by the majority of people not having access to electricity, piped water existed in 
an extremely limited capacity and healthcare facilities were rudimentary613. In addition to 
this, the majority of people did not have access to reliable transport614. Owing to the region's 
lack of private enterprise and its failure to engage in commercial agriculture, its inhabitants 
were extremely reliant on both the Homeland and Republican governments for their 
survival615 . The following table illustrates the economic underperformance of KwaZulu and 
its dependence upon the Republic for funding. 
1972173 1973174 1974175 1975176 
From the Republic: 22,110,000 33,776,000 51,846,000 69,710,000 
Republic Percentage: 68,5% 74% 78,5% 80,5% 
Homeland Sources: 10,199,200 11,679,000 14,252,300 16,883,000 
Homeland Percentage: 31,5% 26% 21,5% 19,5% 
(Butler, Rotberg and Adams 1979, 146: Table 6.4.) 
The increasing levels of funding which were provided to K waZulu were not challenged by 
the white population or by white politicians616. Government had stated that these amounts 
612 Ibid 
613 Ibid 
614 Ibid 
615 Ibid 
616 Ibid, 145 
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which were spent on the homelands were necessary to ensure internal security and it appeared 
that they had successfully sold this idea617. One of the goals of the Apartheid government 
was to get each homeland to accept independence, which would result in their inhabitants 
having no political or residential rights in South Africa618 . In accordance with this, the 
government set about providing the homeland leaders with more control over their 
territories619 . As was mentioned in the literature review, Buthelezi would not accept 
complete independence for K waZulu however; the government did not stop their attempts to 
convince him to change his mind in this regard620 . Power was increasingly handed over to 
Buthelezi in a bid to ultimately allow for him to govern the independent homeland of 
KwaZulu. 
Buthelezi's position as Chief Minister of KwaZulu afforded him the opportunity to dispense 
of resources to those in support of his movement and to further publicise his image as a 
legitimate chief and representative of the Zulu people. His officials were able to provide their 
clients with employment opportunities, with licenses for shops and bottIe stores, with housing 
and food amongst other things621 . In addition, reference is made to an example cited in the 
literature review, which spoke of the manner in which land and rental properties were dealt 
617 Ibid 
618 Schlemmer and Muil1975, 108 
619 Ibid 
620 Butler, Rotberg and Adams 1977,93 & 97 
621 De Haas and Zulu 1994,440 
124 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
with by Buthelezi and his supporters. Mention was made of the fact that Pondo people were 
excluded from buying or renting plots, which were reserved for Zulu people622 . 
The school curriculum in KwaZulu was also reformatted and the revised text books echoed 
the reading of history which Buthelezi espoused623 . The books unquestionably described 
Buthelezi as a legitimate Zulu chief and spoke of Inkatha as being the movement which 
represented Zulu tradition and custom624. Buthelezi also made use of his resources to ensure 
that his status as chief and representative of the Zulu people as a whole, was publicised in 
. d d' b d 625 newspapers, magazmes an ra 10 roa casts . 
How did Buthelezi win the legitimacy required to become KwaZulu's chief 
broker of patronage? 
Buthelezi publicised in a manner which resonated with many individuals, a reading of Zulu 
history which placed emphasis on certain traditions which benefited him directll26 • Whilst it 
appears that many politicians engage in such practices, Buthelezi's situation was different to 
many in that he was able to share his reading of Zulu history in a very public manner. 
Regarding this, mention was made of the fact that inside of K waZulu, Buthelezi was not 
622 Szeftel1994, 192 
623 Golan 1991, 120 
624 Ibid 
625 Waetjen 1999,660 
626 Mzala 1988, 116 
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challenged by an effective opposition627, In addition to this, as a result of his working within 
the confines of the Apartheid structures and in line with the government's policy of separate 
development, he was neither challenged by the Apartheid authorities628 , As such, Buthelezi 
was awarded a political platform upon which he was able to foreground the importance of 
chiefs and of the Zulu royal family to Zulu culture and tradition629, The constant referrals to 
the importance of chiefs and that of Zulu royalty made salient his status as a chief and his 
linkage to Zulu royalty, The reading of history publicised by Buthelezi facilitated his being 
viewed as a legitimate, traditional leader. 
Historically, Zulu chiefs have been the 'guarantors of tribal harmony' 630, They engaged in 
conflict resolution, land distribution and were tasked with the management of social and 
cultural cohesion63 1 , During the colonial era, (discussed in more detail in the contextual 
chapter) Theophilus Shepstone, Secretary of Native Affairs, implemented a system of indirect 
rule in colonial Natal, this became known as the 'Shepstone system,632, The authority of 
chiefs was recognized in this system and they in fact retained control over land 
distribution633 , In 1927 the situation changed when the Black Administration Act (No, 38) 
was introduced, this substantially diminished the authority of the chiefs634, Upon the NP's 
627 Butler, Rotberg and Adams 1977, 57 
628 Ibid, 78 
629Golan 1991, 114 
630 Beall 2005,760 
631 Ibid 
632 Ibid 
633 Ibid 
634 Ibid 
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electoral victory in 1948, the status of chiefs once again went under review635 • They chose to 
reinstate the chiefs with a greater degree of power, as this worked in accordance with their 
ideology of separate development, which became legal policy a few years after their 
• 636 
acceSSIOn to power . 
It was the case that some chiefs who reported to the NP government such as Lucas Mangope 
for example, homeland leader of Bophuthatswana, were viewed as Apartheid lackeys because 
they were believed to be courting the approval of government at the expense of their own 
people. Mangope's ready acceptance of independence and his choice to use Afrikaans 
institutions as models for Tswana brought him into disrepute637 , Buthelezi on the other hand, 
retained for himself an ambiguous image with respect to the liberation struggle638 . His 
refusal of independence and his strong international and domestic presence with respect to 
anti-Apartheid campaigning, whilst working within Apartheid structures awarded him such 
an image639. Whilst as has been mentioned there were some who viewed him as an Apartheid 
puppet and as a illegitimate South African chief, there were many who believed that he was a 
traditional chief who sought to protect his people and as such, he was awarded the support of 
thousands64o. This belief by many in Buthelezi's traditional legitimacy afforded him 
legitimate access to material resources. 
635 Ibid 
636 Ibid 
637 Butler, Rotberg and Adams 1977, 76 & 77 
638Beall 2005, 761 & 762 
639 Butler, Rotberg and Adams 1977,93 
640 Ibid, 81 
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One could argue at this point, that the existence of traditional legitimacy was meaningless as 
it relates to access to material resources, as particularly at the onset of Buthelezi occupying 
the position of Prime Minister of K waZulu, he was made to have access to such resources via 
the Apartheid government. The central South African government did not come out against 
the development of a clientelistic system in K waZulu, indeed the system of patronage worked 
to promote the success of their policy of separate development. Patronage promotes both 
reliance and compliance which it turn, does not bode well for self-development. It would 
seem that the existence of a constituency which was caught up in a cycle of poverty, 
illiteracy, compliance and reliance would not pose a direct threat towards the success of 
separate development. 
In response to the argument which suggests that traditional legitimacy was in fact 
unnecessary as Buthelezi already had access to resources via the Apartheid government, the 
following is noted. In order for Pretoria to recognize Buthelezi as being indispensable, he 
needed to be viewed as legitimate by many Zulu people, in this way commanding the support 
of a large group, who offered him their loyalty. The capacity which Buthelezi possessed to 
manage and in this way control and prevent such a large grouping of people from openly 
challenging the policy of separate development, was what made Buthelezi indispensable to 
Pretoria. This belief by government of the value of Buthelezi was in turn integral to the 
furthering of his own political agenda and his capacity to negotiate his demands with 
Pretoria. Possessing the title of chief provided him with a sorely needed political tool, which 
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he made use of both in his dealings with what became his constituency and with the 
A h 'd h" 641 part el aut ontles . 
Democracy and Patrimonialism 
South Africa's democratization process has marked the end of Buthelezi's grand-scale 
utilization of patronage. Democratic regimes are characterized in part by the existence of a 
free press, by their oversight mechanisms and in addition by the transparent manner in which 
public officials are expected to perform their functions.642 During the Apartheid era, 
Buthelezi, as has been mentioned, dominated the press643 . The newspapers, magazines and 
radio broadcasts in K waZulu spoke of Inkatha in a favourable light and for the most part did 
not serve to act as a critical press, which demanded accountability from its leader644 . Without 
this oversight mechanism being prevalent in the region, Buthelezi's engagement with the 
practice of patronage politics which excluded certain groups, was not openly challenged in a 
public forum645 . In the country's democratic context this is no longer the case, the press of 
today is extremely critical of the manner in which public officials conduct themselves. In 
support of this free press claim, the research undertaken by the Institute for Democracy in 
South Africa (lDASA), the results of which were published in 2005, has been consulted. 
IDASA utilized research from the Afrobarometer, a website which provides various political, 
641 Golan 1991, 114 
642 Mzizi 2004, 196 
643 Waetjen 1999, 660 
644 Ibid 
645 Ibid 
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public opmIOn surveys and analyses thereof, which have been undertaken in Africa and 
which relate to democracy in particular. The following question was posed with respect to 
South Africa's democratic status, 'How effective is the protection of expression, information 
and assembly for all persons irrespective of their social grouping646?, The score achieved in 
relation to this question was 8, with 10 constituting the ideal. The press is free to disseminate 
information, whether critical or not and given the number of people reached by the various 
media forms, public officials are forced to account for their actions. 
Parliament, which is a reflection of the electoral outcome in a democracy, also acts as a 
further mechanism to hold the executive to account647 • This impacts upon the capacity of 
individuals in the executive to engage in types of behaviour which they are not able to 
rationally explain to the legislature and which might bring them into disrepute648 . During the 
Apartheid period Buthelezi was not being held accountable by the K waZulu Legislature in 
fact, all members of the KLA were lnkatha supporters and were extremely loyal to Buthelezi 
and in addition, those occupying positions in the executive of the KLA had been directly 
. db h' 649 appomte y 1m . 
With regards to judicial oversight, it was the case that Buthelezi operated within the 
Apartheid state's rule of law and the position afforded to him by Pretoria of Prime Minister of 
646 Calland and Graham 2005, 33 
647 Calland and Graham 2005, 29 
648 Matlosa 2004, 23 
649 Butler, Rotberg and Adams 1977,57 
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K waZulu, legally entitled him to establish personal control over the region and awarded him 
the right to dispense of resources as he saw fit650. In the country's democratic dispensation 
with its focus on institutions as opposed to personal rule, this practice of patronage politics is 
not openly accepted651 . It no way is it being suggested that patronage politics does not occur 
in democratic regimes however, it is being argued that patronage politics is not openly 
sanctioned in democratic states and as such, those found guilty of it may be subject to legal 
repercussIOns. 
With the end of Apartheid the homeland system was abolished and Buthelezi no longer 
possesses the access to resources on the scale that he once did. No longer is Buthelezi being 
paid by government to keep the citizens of K waZulu in a state of underdevelopment, so as to 
prohibit the emergence of a threat to their reign. Important to note here, is the fact that 
democracy provides people with a formalized process of access to resources and to equal 
treatment before the law652 . In addition, in a democratic dispensation formal institutions exist 
through which individuals are able to ensure that their political and economic rights are not 
being infringed upon. As such, with a focus on institutions the political space for the control 
of resources by autocratic and personalistic leaders is no longer as prolific653 . 
650 Charney 1991, 10 
651 Wiarda 2002, 5 
652 Adam and Moodley 1992, 509 
653 Wiarda 2002, 5 
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Does Buthelezi's practicing of patronage suggest that he in fact did not 
have the attributes of a charismatic leader during the Apartheid era? 
This chapter has provided a detailed account of the manner in which Buthelezi set about 
dispensing patronage to those Zulu people who supported him. Given that much evidence 
exists to support the claim that he practiced patronage politics, does this not mean that the 
possibility of categorizing him as a charismatic leader is nullified? Is it not the case that 
Buthelezi was not in fact a charismatic leader and rather an individual who attained support, 
through the dispensing of goods and services? Charismatic leaders after all possess some 
kind of unique quality which permits them to be viewed as figures of authority. Their status 
as authority figures has to do with their possession of a unique quality as opposed to their 
capacity to dispense of goods or services, so as to attain loyalty from people. Put differently, 
the practice of patronage cannot create charismatic leaders. 
Whilst being fully aware and in agreement with the information which has just been 
mentioned, it appears that it is still plausible to categorize Buthelezi as a charismatic figure. 
In the absence of his access to patronage Buthelezi still attained a large degree of support. As 
was mentioned, Buthelezi became Prime Minister in 1976, a position which afforded him the 
opportunity to dispense of patronage on a grand-scale. However, prior to this time he already 
had a following of loyal supporters which suggests that he did not gain a following simply 
through the practice of patronage politics. At this point the discussion which was held in the 
chapter on charisma and which related to the formation of opposition parties in KwaZulu 
from 1972 to 1974, at the time at which Buthelezi was CEO of the KLA is recalled. 
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During this two year period as was mentioned, four opposition parties emerged so as to 
challenge Buthelezi's plans for the KwaZulu homeland654. All four parties enjoyed no 
success655. After the demise of the final opposition party, 'The Voice of the People', which 
was founded in 1974, Buthelezi put the following to the KLA656. He suggested that all 
opposition parties ought to be banned in K waZulu as opposition in the form of parties went 
against Zulu culture and practice657. The Assembly supported Buthelezi's request however, it 
could not be actioned because the Minister of Bantu Administration and Development 
refused to accept this motion in 1975658. This event was one of the factors which led to the 
formation of the second Inkatha, which emerged in 1975 and which was partially populated 
by those who had supported Buthelezi's request to ban opposition parties in the region659. 
The view espoused in this text is that Buthelezi gained the power to dispense of patronage 
through his charismatic attributes. He convinced both Pretoria and a large following of Zulu 
people of his indispensability and this was the reason behind his access to patronage. In no 
way is the claim being made that Buthelezi achieved a charismatic status through his access 
to patronage but rather, what is being argued is that his access to patronage rested on his 
charismatic personality, as it was this which rendered him indispensable. 
654 Butler, Rotberg and Adams 1977, 57 
655 Ibid 
656 Ibid 
657 Ibid 
658 Ibid 
659 Ibid 
133 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
His charisma was partly responsible for his successful implementation of the process of 
ethnic mobilization which afforded him a large constituency. It was this large following 
which he possessed prior to his attaining of the position of Prime Minister of K waZulu, 
which afforded him access to patronage on such a grand-scale. Pretoria realized his power 
and in an attempt to woo him, awarded him the position of Prime Minister of K waZulu. 
Buthelezi's charisma existed independently of his access to patronage and even though he 
dispensed of patronage, this is not reason enough to suggest that he cannot be classified as a 
charismatic leader. 
Conclusion 
During South Africa's Apartheid era, Buthelezi through his charismatic attributes elicited 
strong emotional commitment from people through effectively appealing to a certain reading 
of Zulu history, a history which fore grounded the importance of chieftaincy and that of the 
Zulu Royal Family. With his title of chief and his convincing demeanour he had leverage 
with regards to his capacity to bargain for political power with Pretoria. The presence of the 
King, who is the most important figure in Zulu custom, at his side during public events 
served to further cement his legitimacy as traditional Zulu chief. 
The latter message was also being echoed in school syllabuses as well as over the radio and 
in magazines. Using his charisma, Buthelezi was able to mobilize along ethnic lines. He 
created a homogenous Zulu 'nation' for some by making dominant his reading of Zulu 
history. Symbols were used to create a sense of cultural affinity between people and in 
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addition, he stressed the belief that the Zulu people were superior to other ethnic groups and 
as such they were unique. With the parameters set for his new constituency and his 
traditional legitimacy gained, Buthelezi set about recruiting members to Inkatha. 
He created the situation in which Inkatha was made to be synonymous with Zulu culture. 
Loyalty to the movement translated into obedience to Zulu custom. As has been illustrated, 
democracy thus far appears to have led to a waning of Buthelezi's power, as is evidenced by 
the dwindling number of votes received by the IFP. His charisma has weakened in the face 
of a political system which is characterized by legal-rationalism and the routinization of 
bureaucracy. Buthelezi is no longer rewarded by the state for his engagement with the 
process of ethnic mobilization. We do not see the Buthelezi of old, adorned in his famous 
leopard skins with assegai in hand, shouting the cries of Zulu Nationalism. Instead, he now 
appears as a subdued member of parliament, adorned in suits of a respectable hue. 
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